



THE MANIFESTO PROJECT

Promoting responsive and
responsible manifestos for
inclusive development

Compilation of Issues and
Evidence on Key Sectors in Ghana

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(CDD-Ghana)

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
PREFACE

The **Promoting Responsive and Responsible Manifestos for Inclusive Development** Project was launched by Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) in the last quarter of 2019 with an aim, among others, to inform and influence national agenda-setting and policy for inclusive development by gathering and synthesizing data and evidence from diverse sources, actors, interests, and stakeholders and feeding these as inputs for political parties in the development of their manifestos ahead of the 2020 general elections. The Project is an acknowledgement of the increasing importance and value attached to manifestos—and to their fulfillment in office—by Ghanaian voters and political parties alike, both during election campaigns and after a government has assumed office.

A key activity and deliverable of this project is the compilation from diverse sources and through various participatory processes and engagements of a catalogue of issues identified as constituting critical problem areas, challenges, and gaps in specific sectors and thematic areas and which militate against national development and progress and thus demand appropriate policy or other remedial intervention from political decision-makers. The catalogue of issues is not prescriptive; it is designed to be primarily diagnostic and descriptive in nature. In conceiving this Project, we determined that, the most appropriate division of labour, is to leave to the political parties the task of prescribing appropriate solutions and interventions to the issues identified. CDD-Ghana's role in this, then, has been primarily to serve as a transmission belt, connecting the parties to various sources of data and evidence and to diverse communities of interest, opinion, knowledge, and expertise within the body politic.

The Center expresses its appreciation to all stakeholders and partners who participated in one or the other of the various activities and engagements that formed part of the development of this document. We are happy to acknowledge the assistance and contribution of the Natural Resource Governance Institute and Ghana Oil and Gas for Inclusive Growth (GOGIG) in the compilation of the Extractives sector portion of this document. The Center is grateful to the Ghana office of the **UK Department for International Development (DFID)** for funding this Project.

It is our hope and expectation that this compilation will help enhance the content and quality of the manifestos of each of our political parties and, in so doing, lead to better-informed, inclusive, and responsible policy making and governance in Ghana. Beyond informing and assisting parties in the development of their campaign manifestos, the information contained in this document provides a helpful guide and reference point for civil society, the journalistic community, stakeholder groups, and the public at large as they review and evaluate the merit and responsiveness of the published manifestos of the respective parties during the campaign season and the performance of government in the period after elections.



H. Kwasi Prempeh
Executive Director

June 30, 2020

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

In the attached document, we have identified and assembled from diverse sources policy-relevant evidence and data on Ghana, covering multiple sectors and thematic areas, and organized them into a table of “issues” (gaps, problem areas, etc.), classified by sector and sub-theme, to assist political parties formulate, as they each see fit, their party’s responses to the identified issues. This Note explains, in brief, the processes we have followed and the activities undertaken to arrive at this compilation of sectoral issues.

Methodology

Selection of Sectors/Thematic Areas. The Summary of Sectoral Issues covers the following ten (10) sectors/thematic areas: Governance, the Economy, Agriculture, Extractives, Social Protection and Marginalized Groups, Education, Health, Housing, Security and Public Safety, and Transport. Due to the constraints of budget, time, and personnel, we did not aim for coverage of all possible sectors. To select which sectors/thematic clusters we would cover, we first considered: (1) the various sectors and portfolios into which the business of the Government of Ghana is traditionally organized and divided by Ministry (together with the corresponding sectoral division of Parliamentary business into Committees) and (2) the thematic and sectoral organization and coverage of recent (2008-2016) manifestos of the two main political parties (NPP, NDC). We also took into consideration the three broad foci of CDD-Ghana’s mission and work (democracy, good governance, and inclusive development). Each of the sectors/thematic areas we finally decided to cover also met at least one of two additional substantive criteria: the sector must have a direct and substantial impact on human development (and the quality of life of Ghanaians) or the capacity or potential to catalyze or propel system-wide effects/change. We also decided to add a multi-sectoral “COVID-19 box” at the end so as to isolate and highlight broadly (at the “sub-theme” level) certain policy-relevant issues brought to the fore by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Identification of Sub-Themes and Issues. For each of the sectors selected, we have generated a catalogue of specific issues, each set of issues falling under a particular sub-theme pertinent to the sector. In most instances, we have been able to provide a short description or elaboration of the issue. To generate this evidence, we undertook a **desk study**, involving painstaking review of a wide range of secondary material. First, we identified various international, regional (African), and national instruments to which the Government of Ghana has subscribed and from which certain politically binding policy commitments and obligations could be inferred. Principal among these are, at the international level, the UN Sustainable Development Goals; at the continental level, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and Ghana country reports of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism; and the national level, the Directive Principles of State Policy and other provisions of the 1992 Constitution. Second, we reviewed various Government policy and planning documents and reports, notably a succession of Medium Term National Development Policy Frameworks, Ghana Beyond Aid Charter and Strategy Document (draft), Report of the Constitution Review Commission, and various sector-specific planning documents. Third, we reviewed survey data from the last seven rounds of Afrobarometer to identify trends in the themes and issues that have been flagged or highlighted by Ghanaians as principal concerns or priorities. Fourth, we consulted and reviewed the manifestos of the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress in each of the last three general elections (2008, 2012, 2016). Lastly, as part of the desk research we reviewed a selection of publications, reports, and studies on contemporary Ghana or a covered sector written or conducted by experts, researchers, academics, think tanks, or international or multilateral bodies.

We held two separate **validation meetings** in Accra in February, 2020, to gather, through moderated discussion and debate (under Chatham House Rules), opinion, reaction, and perspectives on the tentative (desk study) sub-themes and issues from a diverse group of Ghanaians comprising, for each validation meeting, 20 leaders drawn from the media, the private sector, professional groups, academia, civil society, the clergy, youth-focused groups, the public services, and labor.

Lastly, we **commissioned 10 subject matter experts to produce various sector-specific discussion papers**, each paper drawing on both publicly available data and secondary material and the expert's own sectoral knowledge and expertise to provide an overview and analysis of the current state of the sector and identify and describe the structural, policy, or implementation challenges, impediments, and gaps within the sector. A draft of each discussion paper was reviewed by the CDD project team to ensure compliance with the terms of reference. The author then finalized the paper, taking into consideration feedback and comments from the project team. For each commissioned paper, we engaged an **external reviewer**, also with expertise in the field, to provide a technical and substantive evaluation and reaction. Both commissioned paper and the reviewer's evaluation were then presented and subjected to further comment, discussion and critique by participants at an **open forum**. (Each forum was scheduled and held online due to COVID-19 restrictions). Key contributions and insights from the forum were captured in a rapporteur's report.

The issues highlighted in the Sector-by-Sector Issues Chart have been distilled and synthesized from these various sources and series of activities and related outputs.

SECTOR-BY-SECTOR ISSUES CHART

Sector/Thematic Area	Sub-Theme	Description of Issues, Drivers & Gaps
1. GOVERNANCE	A. Constitutional System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disenfranchisement of local communities in the selection of the most important local political officeholder (Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executive or MMDCE) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continued appointment of MMDCE by President has stymied effective decentralization, local political accountability, and community participation and initiative in local government and development. Also ensured one-party, winner-takes-all control of executive authority in all local government communities, regardless of strength of local support of other parties
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Outsized role of the President in the overall constitutional scheme, including control over appointments throughout all levels of the public services and state structure and other prerogatives, has retarded the development of independent institutions and credible checks and balances and sustained patronage politics in a winner-takes-all political culture
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Obligatory appointment of a majority of Ministers from among MPs identified as primary reason for Parliament's inability to play its executive oversight role and ensure credible checks and balances <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "Fusion" also a key driver in pushing the number of Ministers to excessive levels, as Presidents face political pressure to appoint as many MPs as possible as Ministers/deputies - Potential governance crisis if Presidency and Legislature split between two rival parties
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Exclusive presidential power to fill vacancies in key constitutionally designated non-political offices (electoral commission, Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), auditor-general) feeds perception of partisan or improper executive control of such offices and creates friction with and undermines effectiveness of such institutions particularly when there is party turnover in the presidency
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unlimited and unregulated size of membership of Parliament, Ministers, and Supreme Court creates perverse incentives and pressures for unrestrained and unsustainable growth in the size of all three branches. In the case of Supreme Court, absence of ceiling could be used to undermine judicial independence through court packing or perception of court packing

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No role for citizenry to initiate a process of constitutional amendment; amendment procedure leaves only self-interested political class as gatekeepers of constitutional reform
	<p>B. Anti-Corruption</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Persistent non-implementation of article 296(c) of the Constitution on the promulgation of constitutional instrument and statutory instrument to regulate the exercise of discretionary powers where the person or authority exercising that power is not a judge or judiciary officer. Exercise of constitutional, statutory, and administrative discretion is thus left unregulated throughout the public services and executive branch, creating widespread opportunities for abuse of office and corruption ▪ Absence of statutory rules, standards, procedures, and safeguards for addressing issues of public ethics including conflict of interests, nepotism, and use of improper influence in public contracting and other official decision-making ▪ No credible statutory regime for regulating and accounting for the sources and spending of money in political campaigns, coupled with high and escalating cost of contestation for political office, both at party (primaries) and national level fuels corruption among political office holders. "Delegate" system for selection of party candidates for national elective office, as opposed to voting in primaries open to all party members, undermines internal party democracy and fuels open corruption in party primaries ▪ Criminal investigation and investigative agencies (Criminal Investigations Division, Economic and Organized Crime Office, Financial Intelligence Center, etc.) lack independence from political authorities. Large number of high profile corruption-related investigations and cases go "cold" (at various stages of the process from initial media exposé to prosecution), reinforcing a culture of impunity ▪ Limited anti-corruption tools. Statutory definition of corruption extremely narrow. Reliance on traditional, restrictive anti-corruption approaches and sanctions (principally criminal investigation and prosecution) to the exclusion of more effective modern tools like unexplained wealth legislation, non-conviction-based asset recovery remedies, and private civil actions (i.e., private right to initiate and prosecute a civil suit to recover corruption proceeds with a right to retain portion of recoveries) used in other democracies ▪ Widespread economic insecurity and pauperism in retirement, and fear of same, are a significant motive factor contributing to corruption in the public sector ▪ Lack of investment in sustained civic anti-corruption campaign and public education on the social, economic, human, and moral costs and impact of corruption

	C. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No clear political (ministerial) responsibility for fighting corruption or producing results/outcomes in anti-corruption. Anti-corruption as a measurable outcome is not mainstreamed across government and the public services <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Procurement irregularities and abuse remain a significant problem, despite nominally satisfactory procurement law. Apparent use of "restricted tender" in place of "sole sourcing" has not delivered expected value-for-money savings. Law appears to be followed only in a perfunctory "check-the-box" fashion. Entities in violation of the law continue to escape legal sanction from the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) and the Attorney-General's Department. PPA oversight of public procurement generally weak. Composition of PPA does not promote independence from regime control <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Abuse of "ratification" via entity boards and PPA as a device to sanitize <i>ex post</i> unauthorized, including PFMA-violative, transactions tainted by conflict of interests and other appearance of corruption <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Persistent non-enforcement of sanctions provisions (powers of surcharge, etc.) in Public Financial Management Act 2016 (Act 921) (PFMA) for violations revealed in reports of the Auditor General. Responsible ministry (Finance) has no monitoring and sanctions unit <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SOEs continue to make significant losses <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political model of SOE corporate governance, characterized by non-competitive, non-transparent appointment and removal of board and officers by President on the basis of non-objective criteria, continues to distort fiduciary accountability and entity performance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SOEs have become conduits for partisan political patronage, undermining performance goals - Appointment of MPs to boards of SOEs distorts oversight role of MPs and Parliament and interferes with management prerogatives <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No statutory fiduciary liability or culpability for directors and officers for improper conduct or decisions inimical to the interests of the entity
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	D. International Contracting and Agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ State frequently forced to defend costly suits in international arbitration, risking/paying huge judgment awards for alleged breaches of contract. Risk particularly high following party turnover in government. No accountability for improper breaches of contract. Injures country's reputation for fidelity to contract and raises cost of contracts ▪ No standard statutory regime for making and approving international commercial contracts. Process largely ad hoc, driven and led by political principals, with little independent technical preview, due diligence, review and advice. Heightens suspicion of political self-dealing and risk of breach of contract in event of regime change. Mandatory parliamentary approval, routinely secured along party lines and via a certificate of emergency, has proven ineffective as a check on the content and integrity of international loan and other commercial agreements
	E. The Public Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chronic operational under-resourcing of Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs), with resultant low productivity and morale. Goods and services budget, including capex, of key Ministries (including Food and Agriculture, Water and Sanitation, Local Government, and Health) depend disproportionately on donor support ▪ Generally weak capacity (human, technology, data, structures), despite repeated, if inconsistent, efforts at public service reform ▪ Widespread displacement and domination of public administration by party politics and politicians threatens to destroy the independence and professionalism of the bureaucracy. Rule-based decision-making routinely displaced by political criteria and discretion ▪ Persistent and improper partisan political interference in public services personnel decisions (recruitment, promotion, transfer, discipline) has undermined meritocratic and non-partisan ethos of the public bureaucracy and weakened incentives for diligent and competent performance and service. "Protocol" has displaced merit-based open competitive recruitment

	F. Local government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extremely slow progress on fiscal decentralization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Percentage of revenues transferred from center to local government (currently about 7.5%) comparatively low, compounded by delays in release of funds ▪ Creation of new Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (by executive fiat) on the basis of partisan political criteria, without sufficient regard to economic capacity or viability of local government unit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proliferation of economically weak and underfunded MMDAs ▪ Weak inter-sectoral/departmental coordination undermines effective administrative decentralization and service delivery at local level ▪ Weak structures below the district assembly level (sub-structures). The sub-structures, as the level of government closest to the people, serve as the link between the assembly and citizens. Various attempts at effective operationalization of these structures have not been successful, culminating in apathy and mistrust as citizens feel disconnected from their governments at the local level
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2. ECONOMY	A. Structure of Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Loss of dominance of agriculture to services in terms of contribution to GDP has not translated into structural transformation of the economy due to dominance of informal employment in services sector (associated with low productivity and earnings) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of education and skills of labor force generally low. Large proportion of low skilled among labor force is a major contributory factor to high level of informal and vulnerable employment
	B. Fiscal Policy: Revenues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Job growth has continued to lag behind economic (GDP) growth. Economic growth driven by stronger growth in extractive sector (and construction) as well as financial intermediation in services sector, all being sectors that generate limited direct employment. Agriculture and manufacturing, which have generally better employment-generating prospects, continue to record slower growth ▪ Persistent over-reliance on export of a few primary commodities ▪ Persistent overreliance on nonresident investors ▪ Excessive dependence on imports, including food and basic household supplies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Country is a net importer of basic foods such as rice, poultry, sugar, and vegetable oils
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low tax-to-GDP ratio: Over last two decades, the tax ratio in Ghana has remained around 12.8 percent of GDP, below sub-Saharan African (SSA) average of 15 percent (IMF, 2019). High political incentives and pressures to tax less and spend more <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ghana relies heavily on indirect taxes, and its value added tax (VAT) rate is one of the highest in Africa, even after correcting for exemptions. Mobile phone usage is among the most heavily taxed - Income taxes are heavily dependent on the extractives sector and payroll - Tax evasion widespread in self-employment and business sector. Big, mainly foreign, companies benefit from massive tax exemptions - At 25%, corporate income tax rate is one of the lowest on the continent (compared to 30% and 35% in other African countries), and taxes on real property are negligible - Incidence of taxation on inequality is among the most regressive in the ECOWAS region

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak state capacity (personnel, data, technology, administrative systems) to identify, assess, facilitate payment of, and collect taxes, particularly in the informal and entrepreneurial sector, coupled with a generally weak sense of civic obligation to pay tax <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Widespread public perception and anecdotal evidence of waste/profligacy, non-value for money spending, and corruption further weakens citizens' sense of civic obligation to pay tax or provides a pretext for widespread tax evasion or resistance - Growing competitive politics of "freebies" weakens supply-side political incentive and resolve to enforce tax compliance, especially on politically influential informal sector (despite recent "presumptive taxation" policy). High political incentives to tax less and spend more ▪ Substantial revenue loss from discretionary, political "administration" of tax waivers/exemptions ▪ Boom in urban commercial and residential real estate sector and home ownership rates over the last two decades has not translated into significant collections of property taxes as a source of local or national revenues. Partly the result of chronically outdated or unrealistically low local government property valuations ▪ Ineffective monitoring/accountability of Free Zones scheme. Companies seem to be enjoying very generous tax benefits without clear evidence that they are exporting the statutory minimum 70% of their output. No accessible, published national data on proportion of total export revenue attributable to Free Zone companies ▪ Substantial, recurring revenue leakages in public sector revealed in annual Auditor-General's Reports <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of clear, consistent political support for Auditor-General's role, as evidenced in persistent non- or under-implementation of findings and recommendations in annual reports, including enforcement of surcharges
	C. Fiscal Policy: Spending	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unrestrained growth in size of government and government machinery. Some functionally defunct, non-commercial entities continue to be retained on public budget ▪ Absence of a database and system for rational and efficient targeting/means-testing of expenditures/transfers: Without a good database on citizens and a sufficiently formal economy, transfers are not well targeted, resulting in misallocated expenditure

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No methodological assurance of value for money in public contracting and procurement, including major infrastructural projects <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak statutory restraint on spending: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fiscal Accountability law specifies a maximum percentage (i.e., 5%) of the overall fiscal balance as a proportion of GDP. But it only requires a positive primary balance (an important component of the overall fiscal balance). No specific minimum positive value (i.e., x%) of the primary balance (e.g., as a proportion of revenue) is stated. The requirement of just any positive value, no matter how small, is weak - Fiscal Responsibility law specifies the circumstances under which the fiscal responsibility rules may be suspended. Among others, they include "... periods where the Gross Domestic Product growth rate is one per cent or less." Perverse fiscal incentives may not arise if the circumstances that warrant the suspension of the fiscal rules are outside the control of politicians. Commodity price shocks in global markets, natural disasters, and epidemics are examples of events that are outside the control of politicians. But "a GDP growth rate of one per cent or less" is not necessarily an event that is outside the control of politicians. It could be the result of mismanagement by politicians and bureaucrats. This is a weakness of the law <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant number of uncompleted/abandoned public infrastructure projects. Study conducted between 2014 and 2017 shows about one-third of projects started between 2011 and 2013 were not completed, on average about 65% completion with 56% of contract sum disbursed. Estimated 19% of MMDAs investment expenditure on projects likely to be never completed
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	D. Debt Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Country at high risk of debt distress<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Continuing vulnerability from large persistent financing needs (mostly infrastructure deficit)- Off-budget operations or misclassification of public debt (e.g., Energy Sector Levy Act (ESLA), financial sector bailout, Sino-hydro agreement), which could give rise to significant contingent liabilities, understate the true magnitude of public debt- Debt-to-GDP ratio is a misleading measure of debt sustainability, as there is a weak relationship in the Ghanaian context between GDP growth and growth of exports and tax revenues, which are the main sources of debt service- Non-residents hold more than 60% of total debt stock
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3. AGRICULTURE	A. Crops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sector characterized by generally low productivity
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low GoG expenditure in agriculture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ghana ranks among the lowest in Africa in terms of public expenditure on agriculture; lags behind 10% (of GDP) target agreed under Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (Maputo Declaration, 2003) - About 2/3 of MoFA budget allocated for operational costs (mostly salaries and input subsidies), donors fund over 70% of capital expenditures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant budget spent on subsidies for inputs and other facilities, but evidence shows inefficiencies and low returns relative to cost <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cost of fertilizer subsidy increased from GHC247 million to GHC462 million in 2019, and certified seeds increased from GHC64 million to GHC191 over the same period. However, inefficiencies, gaps in targeting, lack of transparency, and weak monitoring and evaluation undermine effectiveness and limit coverage of the agricultural subsidy program
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public investment in sector (on feeder roads, social infrastructure, irrigation, extension, storage/logistics) not only low but also not well focused on high potential areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited investments in infrastructure in areas of high agriculture potential, e.g., Northern Savannah Ecological Zone, Afram Plains, Accra Plains, etc.
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Widening spatial inequality between rural and urban areas and (perception of) dwindling opportunity for rural youth continues to fuel outmigration of youth to southern urban capitals (and beyond the shores of the country)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Farmers face persistent economic vulnerability, generally price-takers on both input and marketing ends of the value chain. High risk of post-harvest losses from poor market and distribution access, including small size of industrial market (agro-processing sector) and generally weak investment in food storage and preservation facilities

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Productivity growth constrained by slow adoption of new technologies (including improved crop varieties) and limited access to critical inputs notably seed and fertilizer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seed supply highly dependent on government support, with minimal private sector participation, thus limiting smallholder farmer access to good quality seeds
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ineffective provision of extension services at decentralized level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low capacity and limited and untimely provision of public funding
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Agricultural R&D is grossly underfunded and poorly coordinated <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Spending on agricultural R&D is about 0.7% of agricultural output (below Kenya's 1.4% and South Africa's 2%, less than 1% target - CSIR funding largely dependent on donors - Agricultural research is fragmented among many small, externally funded projects with little coordination and almost no private sector participation or support
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of regular, systematic collection and analysis of data on sector/sub-sectors, undermines proper measurement of returns on spending, oversight, and planning
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Insecure property rights (in land) a major barrier to private investment in sector, as difficulty of securing and enforcing titles discourages both investment in large commercial estates and in physical improvements like irrigation and storage systems
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Insecurity of land rights particularly acute for women. Only 11% of women farmers own their land compared to roughly 30% of male farmers.
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inability of farmers to borrow against equity (land) a major credit constraint
	<p>B. Cocoa</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yields remain low and far below potential <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Majority of cocoa farmers, producing about 50% of national output, are in category of producers with the lowest productivity levels - Ageing trees (23% of acreage under cultivation have trees above 30 years) - Pest and disease infestation (7%)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Significant number of unimproved varieties - Sub-optimal agronomic practices (technology) - Growth in total output over past decades have come from expansion of area under cultivation than yield increase due to improved technology. But new land suitable for cocoa farming is in short supply
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Average age of cocoa farmers in the 50s <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As a labor-intensive activity, cocoa farming best suited to youth
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited access to financing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Informal money lenders with exorbitant terms are a major source of credit. Only about 5% of farmers obtain formal (bank) loans
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant barriers to entry for interested youth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to land, start-up capital, and services. COCOBOD principally focused on existing farmers
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Growing threat from climate change <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changes in temperature and rainfall patterns, exacerbated by widespread loss of forest cover, making cocoa-growing belt less suitable for cocoa and necessitating increased investment in more drought-resistant varieties and in pesticides and fungicides
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Loss of and threat to land under cultivation from 'galamsey' activities
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unreliability of COCOBOD input (seedlings, fertilizer, spraying) distribution system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - COCOBOD frequently falls short on promise to deliver inputs - Farmers often not adequately informed about level of service to expect, frustrates planning

<p>4. EXTRACTIVES (OIL & GAS, MINING)</p>	<p>A. Governance, Policy & Strategy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No clear policy-backed national strategy to use extractives to drive long-term economic transformation across multiple sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, etc). Focus limited to generating immediate revenues and, to some extent, facilitating local participation in employment, equity, and business services opportunities in upstream sector ▪ No clear or established statutory or judicial explication or operationalization of the fiduciary obligations implied by and arising out of provisions of the Constitution vesting “every mineral in its natural state” (as well as public lands) in the territory of Ghana, whether on land or sea, in the President “on behalf of, and in trust for the people” ▪ Licensing regime characterized by lack of transparency and application of unclear and inconsistent standards <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inconsistent treatment of similarly-situated investors – offering substantially different fiscal regimes to different investors despite similarities in blocks. Sets bad precedent, undermines predictability, and opens the door to and feeds perception of corruption - First licensing round characterized by data, fiscal and transparency gaps. Lack of clarity regarding criteria for recourse to direct negotiation, as opposed to competitive bidding ▪ Inadequate national response framework for managing environmental/operational risks and damage associated with extractives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recurring problem of cyanide spillage (mostly from illegal mining), also oil spills and seepage offshore ▪ No national policy, plan, or strategy for engaging the issue and prospect of “energy transition” –the idea that crude oil is predicted to lose its commercial value in the future as global demand shifts in favor of renewable sources, in response to climate change and other environmental concerns
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	B. Local Content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak progress toward meeting local content targets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Challenges include lack of training opportunities for Indigenous Ghanaian Companies (IGCs) to develop the requisite knowledge of the sector and lack of technical, financial, and managerial skills to survive in such a complex sector; inadequate business development platforms to forge collaboration among IGCs; no national level certifications for the sector, hence acquiring standard certification is expensive for local businesses and Lack of government’s plan for skills transfer, bureaucratic processes, and challenges with capacity development efforts
	C. Revenue Management and Utilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) consistently spread thin across several expenditure/project lines, making annual allocation per project inadequate, thus unduly delaying project completion and minimizing intended impact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Also, poor monitoring and evaluation of ABFA projects ▪ No statutory guidelines or regulations to define scopor boundaries of discretion of Minister of Finance to set or change ceiling on Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF). Creates perverse incentives that defeat original intent of the GSF ▪ Inconsistent application of Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) provisions for petroleum revenues to be deposited into the Contingency Fund ▪ Low returns on Ghana Petroleum Fund investments with negative real interest on GSF in some years compared to market benchmarks ▪ PRMA recognizes an important revenue stream, signature bonuses, that aligns with the main Exploration and Production Act, 2016, however recourse to this revenue stream has been weak ▪ No PRMA-like consolidated and comprehensive mineral revenue management law to guide the use of mineral revenues, despite the enactment of the Mineral Income Investment Fund Act, 2018 (Act 978) to manage and invest proceeds of the country’s equity interest, mineral royalties and related incom

	D. GNPC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Persistent use of portion of Company’s allocated revenue to cover downstream trading losses detracts from efficiency. Examples: provision of US\$100 million guarantee for Karpower emergency power ship, liquidation of US\$ 31.34 million debt owed BNP Paribas in respect of 10 parcels of crude oil imported for refining by Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), advance of US\$ 50 million to the Ministry of Finance for the construction of Western Corridor Roads, and payment of US\$ 18.75 million to Trafigura to replenish national crude strategic reserves maintained by Bulk Oil Storages and Transportation (BOST)
	E. Gas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited and inconsistent public disclosure of information, despite having several reporting obligations ▪ Relationship between the Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC) and GNPC remains unsettled, question of which institution is gas aggregator remains contentious ▪ No legislative framework for the gas sector, despite clear recommendations from the gas masterplan. This has led to regulatory overlaps between Petroleum Commission, Energy Commission, Public Utility Regulatory Commission, and National Petroleum Authority. No clarity on which agency regulates which stream of the gas value chain from production to transportation to processing to utilization, no clear-cut policy on secondary gas market developments, gas pricing remains complicated due to lack of transparency in the pricing formula – Gas to Power

<p>5. SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MARGINALIZED GROUPS</p>	<p>A. Inequality</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Data show Ghana as one of the most unequal in the ECOWAS sub-region, surpassed only by Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone, with income disparities in Ghana getting worse rather than better. Wealthiest 10% of Ghanaians command 32% of total consumption (more than is consumed by the bottom 60% of the population), while the very poorest 10% consume only 2% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 2013 and 2016 economic growth for the richest 10% was more than 1.4 times greater than for the poorest - Gender disparities remain significant on poverty and other indicators. Women are poorer and have fewer assets. Only 6% of the richest Ghanaians are women <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Percentage of persons living in poverty decreased significantly between 2006 and 2013 (and since the decade before that), though actual numbers did not drop by much (from 7 million in 2006 to 6.4 million in 2012/13 and 6.8 million in 2016/17). Poverty rate has experienced only marginal decline since 2012, while numbers living in extreme poverty (i.e., persons unable to meet their basic food needs) have increased <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extreme poverty declined from 8.4% in 2012/13 to 8.2% in 2016/17, but absolute number of Ghanaians living in extreme poverty increased from 2.2 million in 2013 to 2.4 million in 2017, in spite of positive economic growth and the reduction in the percentage of people living in poverty - The chance of a Ghanaian child living in poverty has increased, the North-South differentials remain wide, as do disparities between men and women, between urban and rural areas, across and within regions of the country, and between cash crop and food crop farmers. Poverty rates hover above 60% in the northern and western parts of the country, in sharp contrast to the southern and middle halves of the country where poverty has fallen below 20%. The highest internal inequalities are in the Upper West Region, which is also the poorest region in the country <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Measured by the <i>Commitment to Reducing Inequalities Index</i> (CRII) – a composite index measuring government efforts to reduce inequalities using public spending, taxation and the protection of workers and women’s rights – Ghana ranked 115th out of 157 countries worldwide in 2018, and 18th out of 41 countries in Africa. Compared with other Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMIC), Ghana ranks 27 out of 44 in the level of commitment to reducing inequalities
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	<p>B. Social Protection Programs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social protection benefits (under GSFP, LIPW, Capitation Grant, NHIS, and LEAP) not anchored in specific legislation or common policy-driven strategy. Dependent on yearly budget priorities and allocations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Benefits seen as discretionary favor or charity from government, as opposed to a statutory entitlement. Undermines ability of beneficiaries to demand accountability for quality of program administration and service delivery or to activate complaints mechanism <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Generally low levels of budgetary allocations and spending on social protection; compounded by irregularity/delays in release of grants. Average spending of lower middle-income countries in Africa on non-contributory social protection is around 2.1% of GDP (1.6% for lower middle-income countries worldwide); Ghana's was 0.6% of GDP (2019) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LEAP cash grant consistently low even by standards of sub-Saharan Africa. LEAP disbursement per one-person household translates into less than half of extreme poverty line of GH\$792 per adult per year set in Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS7) (about 13% of household consumption or less than six days' worth of food per month) - LEAP has experienced increased coverage over past years, helping over 320,000 households in extreme poverty, but government budget allocations do not provide for expanded coverage - Per capita spending on NHIS beneficiaries (about \$30) well below WHO recommended minimum (\$86) - GSFP (Ghana School Feeding Program) = GHC 1 per pupil <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Benefit levels (including for both LEAP and NHIS) reflect historical benchmarking and tailoring of programs for rural poor. Benefit levels not adjusted for covered urban poor who face significantly higher living costs, despite growing urbanization of poverty <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak linkages (complementarity) between different benefit programs
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	C. Children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trafficking of children persists. Children remain vulnerable to trafficking due to poverty and lack of opportunities in rural areas. Children commonly trafficked from poorer regions to urban centers, forced into exploitive labor in fishing, street vending, begging and domestic servitude
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coverage gaps remain in birth registration system, particularly in relation to capture and recording of rural births. Thus, weak database to inform policy and measure effectiveness of intervention on children
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chronic non-implementation and non-enforcement of protective and safeguarding provisions of Juvenile Justice Act and Children's Act <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Child panels required to be set up in districts to provide alternative pathway for child offenders and victims remain unimplemented. Thus, child offenders continue to be processed through regular (adult) justice system, in violation of their statutory rights - Absence of juvenile correctional centers/reformatories in most regions (results in juvenile offenders in adult prison and recidivism) and chronic under-resourcing of very limited facilities, including the girls' home in Osu, Accra
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fragmentation and lack of interagency coordination; e.g., between Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Social Welfare in relation to juvenile correctional centers, despite establishment of Ministry responsible for Children
	D. Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low representation of women in governance and leadership (executive, legislative, party, corporate) at all levels of state ▪ Gender-based crimes, including domestic violence, rape, and "defilement" (underage rape), remain under-reported, under-investigated, and under-prosecuted. Reporting of rape not helped by the fact that medical exam to support an allegation of rape attracts a steep out-of-pocket cost for the complainant (ranging from GHC300 to GHC800) ▪ Women disproportionately represented in informal economy and under-represented in formal sector, exacerbating gender-based income inequality and poverty ▪ Nearly a quarter of all women over 15 years of age have never attended school, double the percentage for men ▪ Persistent non-implementation of constitutional provisions protecting the interests of women: prohibition against dehumanizing or harmful customary practices (article 26(1)) and property rights of spouses (article 22(1))

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Opportunity provided by article 17(4) of the Constitution to enact comprehensive affirmative action framework legislation to enable state and private sector alike, including political parties, to adopt measures to address historical gender and other socio-economic disparities has yet to be seized
	E. Persons with Disabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eight disability commitments made by GoG at 2018 Global Disability Summit, including promoting increased participation of and engagement of PWDs in governance at all levels, remain outstanding and unrealized ▪ Built environment, including most public buildings, remains physically inaccessible to PWDs, despite legislation (2006) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ghana Accessibility Standards (GAS) for built environment already finalized and published but yet to be implemented or operationalized. Training and sensitization on GAS to build capacity of appropriate agencies, notably Physical Planning and Works departments of MMDAs remains outstanding ▪ Special circumstances and needs of various classes of PWDs not appropriately mainstreamed into policies and programs ▪ Lack of transparency in local administration of share of District Assemblies Common Fund earmarked for PWDs
	F. Elderly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extremely low coverage of old age pension. Ghana ranks lowest among sub-Saharan African middle income countries reporting data. Less than 8% of elderly (>60 years) receive a SSNIT pension (compared to Sub-Saharan average of about 20%), together with elderly on LEAP, coverage is still a low 11%. Vulnerability in old age makes constitutional mandatory retiring age of 60 especially onerous (for formal sector employees) ▪ National Ageing Policy and associated Implementation Plan, first approved by cabinet in 2010 and reviewed in 2018, yet to be translated into legislation ▪ Elderly Welfare Card issued to enable elderly access free public transport and health services has not been renewed or reactivated in recent years ▪ Persistent abuse of elderly women in “witches’ camps” in various communities in the northern Region persists

<p>6. EDUCATION</p>	<p>A. Basic</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Despite success of interventions to boost enrollment (capitation grant, school feeding, free school uniforms), a large population of children (over 400,000) are not enrolled in basic school (mostly from poor households and the northern belt of the country). The northern regions of the country have the highest percentage of persons who have never been to school, with the former Northern Region having the highest male and female rates of 43.2% and 64.1%, respectively <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access impediments include: acute shortage of classrooms, long home-to-school distances, and delays in capitation grant payments - Acute physical access impediments for children with disabilities. Proportion of children with disabilities in basic education make up less than 0.5% of enrollment, despite accounting for 1.6% of the total pre-tertiary age cohort. Almost no regular basic school had handrails and less than 9% equipped with ramps <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Learning outcomes remain a significant area of concern <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only 2% of pupils in P2 could read at grade level (2015), with 50% unable to read a single word; 75% of P6 students not proficient in English or Mathematics - Large number of children repeating. Repeater rates estimated at 16% in some primary grades and 19% in first grade of JHS - Completion rate remains high at primary level but lower at JHS <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Demand for public pre-primary and primary school continues to weaken in favor of costlier private options (even among poorer households) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rate of growth in number of private schools significantly exceeds public basic school growth <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shortage of public schools in deprived communities and new settlements <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shortage of qualified teachers, including at JHS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High proportion of untrained teachers in private schools
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak management and accountability systems at the school, community and district levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor supervision and mentorship of teachers, ensuring time-on-task, and administration of capitation grant - High teacher absenteeism, including at JHS
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shift of public resources and priorities away from basic in favor of secondary education, weakening foundations of public educational system. While primary education, received 30% of education sector budget between 2007 and 2010, its share of the education budget dropped to 18% between 2017 and 2020. (On the other hand, secondary education went from 15% of the budget to 35% of the budget over the same period) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Substantial, perennial under-investment in infrastructure at pre-primary and primary education. Generally poor quality of physical infrastructure - Most basic schools have no nurseries - Poor teacher accountability, reflected in weak authority of school heads, poor teacher supervision and high absenteeism
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rural and deprived communities, including newer urban settlements, chronically disadvantaged by gross inequalities in spatial distribution of trained teachers
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Substantial number of children enrolled at pre-primary/primary level drop out in transition to junior high. Persistently higher girl-child drop-out rate

	<p>B. Secondary/Senior High School</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entitlement to “Free SHS” not secured and protected as a statutory benefit. Beyond providing greater security and certainty, statutory protection will enable the operational and administrative aspects and other details of the benefit to be more carefully and transparently set out in appropriate legislative instrument and ensure that any policy change to the program or benefit is legislatively debated and approved <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Implementation of “Free SHS” has grown enrollment numbers substantially at secondary level, but has put physical capacity and fiscal resources under severe stress, raising sustainability risks. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Linking “Free SHS” to the boarding school model has substantially weakened political support for “de-boarding” secondary education. Unclear national policy regarding future of community day schools - Shortage of schools and classrooms <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Persistent under-representation of learners with disabilities: only 0.2% of SHS enrollment, despite representing 1.7% of age-eligible population <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor textbook-student ratio <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Learning outcomes, measured by performance on WASSCE, poor for both core and elective subjects (esp. math and science), with worst performance in northern belt regions. Gender disparities, disadvantaging girls, across the board. Also substantial inter-school disparities within same region <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low completion rate
	<p>C. Technical and Vocational Education/Training (TVET)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor public image and perception of TVET as option for under-performing students; hence very low demand and attendance, although signs of recent growth in enrollment <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Generally weak integration of TVET within the overall educational system <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor state of training facilities and equipment <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited scope/range of skills and training provided. Fails to cover diverse needs of students or labor market <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low industry interest, participation, and sponsorship <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Large proportion of teaching staff lack technical qualifications <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Generally poor learning outcomes <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TVET receives less than 5% of overall educational expenditure

	D. Tertiary/ Higher Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Despite growth in number of tertiary institutions, demand (admissions) far outstrips available spaces (admissions), especially in public universities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low enrollment in private tertiary institutions ▪ Gender disparity ratio in favor of males; also low participation by PWDs and students from disadvantaged backgrounds ▪ Course offerings not sufficiently diversified or differentiated across universities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Undergraduate students in public universities often compelled to enroll in courses not their choice ▪ Little to no career/academic guidance in selection of courses and majors ▪ Lecturer scholarly productivity and output low, with annual publication per lecturer per year at 0.5 ▪ Poor and inadequate teaching and learning resources (technology, labs, equipment) ▪ Substantial infrastructure deficits, notably in student accommodation and lecture halls Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in student halls ▪ Inadequate demand and capacity/ facilities for STEM education: Enrolments substantially below prescribed STEM to humanities ratio of 60:40
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7. HEALTH	A. Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Institutional organization of the sector is fragmented, with several autonomous agencies (with independent access to or sources of financing) and weak central or ministerial-level coordination - Militates against policy coherence, alignment of strategies, and effective reform implementation - Turf battles between MOH and its main agencies, notably GHS, NHIA, and CHAG
	B. Policy and Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of clarity on overall philosophy and strategic objective and approach that directs and drives the sector: Is it preventive and promotive or curative care? Traditional bias towards curative care is evident. Is that the result of deliberate policy? Is that the right choice for the country?
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No clear articulation of strategy to maximize or support private sector and align their mission with overall sector goals, despite private sector providing over 50% of healthcare services in the country (85% in pharmaceuticals)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chronic under-prioritization and under-investment in mental health and related services
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant shift in disease burden over the last decade (with cardiovascular/lifestyle management diseases growing sharply in prominence) not reflected in sector policy or strategy. E.g. medications for cardiovascular diseases not covered under NHIS
	C. Service Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall decline in access to health services, especially in rural communities (GLSS, R7)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overall poor quality of healthcare delivery across the board (from primary to tertiary), with substantial spatial (geographic) imbalances in access to quality healthcare
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chronic underinvestment and low capacity in medical diagnostics
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inadequate and inequitable distribution of critical staff, with rural and northern zones worst affected
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Primary-level and secondary-level care poorly integrated, with weak gatekeeper and ineffective referral system between them
D. Financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sector is over-reliant on donors (aid and grants) to finance goods and services (and capex) component of the budget 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Traditional healthcare delivery model, with government as the primary employer of health personnel leaves little fiscal space (after payroll) for capital investments (equipment, technology, etc.) and other essential supplies (technology, etc). Is this a sustainable model? 	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ District health services generally receiving a diminishing direct share of the budget vis-a-vis the allocations to and from the center (MOH and GHS HQ), which have been growing
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Health budgets to sub-national level generally allocated on an “incremental budgeting” basis, thus, reinforces historical disparities in inter-district budgetary allocations and therefore: not appropriately responsive to pro-poor, needs-based, or cost or performance-based demands
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tendency to invest in new, additional “brick and mortar” without maximizing value of existing investments, including uncompleted projects
	E. NHIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NHIS coverage remains below 40% of eligible population, with majority of Ghanaians living in poverty not yet enrolled. Less than 2% of “extremely poor” (living on less than GH¢ 2.17 (\$0.50) per day, GSS, 2014b), are covered ▪ Scheme continues to face financial sustainability risks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decoupling of revenue stream for NHIS from its enrollment (size), combined with the scheme’s fairly broad package of benefits and administrative inefficiencies, has resulted in its financial obligations (expenditures) substantially outpacing revenue, producing a perennial financial crisis - Extreme delays in reimbursing service providers causing cash flow and debt problems for service providers. This has resulted in a significant rise in Out of Pocket payments and ‘informal charging’ - Scheme has not explored opportunities to expand coverage to or target likely premium-paying/revenue-generating sources (e.g. middle class, diaspora), partly because of its perception as a pro-poor program

	F. CHPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Original conception of Community Health Planning Services (CHPS) as a mobile doorstep community-based health delivery service, as opposed to the conventional clinic/facility-based service delivery model, has not been realized in implementation. Various factors, both supply side and demand side, have led to the persistence/return of conventional clinic-based model, thereby undermining the goal of using the CHPS concept to significantly increase health service access for rural and hard-to-reach populations by taking the service to their doorstep - Focus has shifted from the idea of a CHPS “zone” (community-centered) to a CHPS “compound” (facility-centered) - Unintended consequence of NHIS, which also follows a clinic-centered curative model
	G. Data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Construction of CHPS compounds appears to have taken precedence over resourcing the compounds. Many compounds lack the basic amenities (e.g., water, sanitation facilities) to make them livable ▪ Data ecosystem has gaps that limit the ability to identify and measure the “left behind” and the extent of marginalization. For example, the administrative service database, while providing details of service provided, is unable to capture data on those not using health facilities – in other words, those who by definition are excluded. Also fails to capture crucial demographic data (e.g., income, ethnicity, religion) that helps to measure the extent of vulnerability or marginalization

8. HOUSING	A. Urban	▪ Persistent and growing housing deficit
		▪ Widespread non-enforcement of municipal spatial and land use plans and building regulations
		▪ Rapid urbanization and land shortage, leading to urban sprawl
		▪ Proliferation of slums and informal settlements in cities and towns <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large population of outdoor sleepers and homeless in urban areas
		▪ High cost of urban home prices (driven principally by high cost of land)
		▪ No social housing/housing-oriented social protection program
		▪ Products of SOEs in urban housing market (State Housing Company, Tema Development Company) priced for formal sector middle to upper middle class buyers, while private real estate developers target their products at nonresident Ghanaians or buyers with dollar-indexed incomes
		▪ Weak commitment towards affordable housing
		▪ Dominance of informal/own-build modes of housing finance; underdeveloped mortgage finance markets
	▪ Lack of clarity on status of private residential leasehold-based properties upon expiration of lease term <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Wholesale recourse to common law reversion rule, without a statutory remedy, will deprive large number of urban homeowners and their families of their primary asset and likely lead to social conflict 	
B. Rural	▪ Absence of clear national policy, plans, or programs for rural housing or upgrade of technology of traditional rural housing	

9. SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY	A. Terrorism and Cross-Border Threats	▪ Porous borders, coupled with spotty state presence and conditions of local social and economic marginalization and poverty raises risks and vulnerabilities in border communities, especially on our northern borders
		▪ Growing population of sub-region nationals resident in the country without proper or regular documentation
		▪ Risk of opportunistic external exploitation of local communal or seasonal conflicts, including chieftaincy-related conflicts and farmer-herder conflicts, especially in border communities
		▪ Proliferation of small arms and related domestic capacity to manufacture simple weapons
		▪ Increasing maritime security threats from piracy and illegal fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
	B. Political Vigilantism	▪ Limited income and job opportunities for marginalized youth in an atmosphere of toxic political party rivalry enabled by a winner-takes-all political culture where control of Executive power comes with plenary partisan control of vast patronage opportunities and advantages, including impunity from criminality for partisans
		▪ Subjection of law enforcement and other security agencies to the operational and administrative control of political principals
		▪ "Protocol" recruitment into the security services on the basis of partisan criteria
		▪ Partisan division in trust for the Electoral Commission
		▪ Unresolved grievances/accusations and counter-grievances/-accusations from past incidents, including 2019 Ayawaso West Wuogon Constituency by-election violent encounter. Non-implementation of Short Commission Report recommendations and ensuing legislation banning and criminalizing party-linked "vigilante" groups
	C. General Law and Order; Common Crime	▪ Police largely a reactive force, with poor proactive capability (including intelligence) to detect and deter crime
		▪ Local police often lack the equipment, resources, and personnel to respond appropriately and in timely fashion to reported crime or calls for emergency assistance
		▪ Inequitable spatial and functional allocation of scarce public law enforcement resources, including personnel on duty, (often without regard to differential crime risk or data) deprives many at-risk communities of adequate policing and protection from crime
▪ Proliferation of and related domestic capacity to manufacture small arms enables easy criminal access to locally manufactured pistols, rifles, and shotguns		
▪ Growing drug abuse and "streetism" among out-of-school or unemployed teenage youth		

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor municipal regulatory and by-law enforcement capacity ▪ Built environment in urban areas hinders effective policing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Informal settlements - Chronically poor illumination of streets, highways (especially rural), and neighborhoods
	D. Natural Resource/Environmental Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption in law enforcement, including in recruiting, heightens risk of infiltration by and collusion with criminal elements ▪ Social toleration of generalized indiscipline and disregard of anti-social behavior and infractions in public spaces (e.g., open defecation, rampant flouting of traffic laws by motorists; widespread squatter-trespassing and resultant informal settlements; littering; jaywalking; police corruption, etc.) has created a “culture” of permissive low-grade law-breaking and impunity, including by high public officials ▪ Increasing illegal fishing by foreign (Chinese) vessels in Ghana’s jurisdictional waters ▪ ‘Galamsey’ problem persists and is spreading, defying diverse interventions, including recent high profile interagency/inter-ministerial and multi-agency security interventions. Failure of state interventions in the face of increasing sophistication of illegal mining equipment and methods, foreign immigrant (Chinese) involvement, and mounting costs to environment, farmlands, and critical water bodies creating a crisis of public confidence for state security and political agencies and concerns about effectiveness of state capacity ▪ Persistent illegal logging and shipment of high-value timber species

	E. Overall Security Sector Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Who does what when? Plethora of agencies in the security and intelligence sector (GAF/DI, GPS, NSA to the President, Min of NS, NS Coordinator, RD of Min of Foreign Affairs, BNI, EOCO, NACOB, FC, GIS, CPS etc.) and their divergent political and bureaucratic placements and reporting lines, institutional cultures and histories, mandates and budgets, give rise to recurring or potential issues of role conflict and coordination, as well as inter-jurisdictional jealousies, turf wars, and mission creep or avoidance<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Use of "National Security" to effect arrests in common criminal matters (with quasi-political coloration) within everyday competence of police reinforces widespread negative perception of National Security as a partisan political tool- Operational methods of "National Security" operatives often heavy-handed and overly dramatic and without regard to the rights of the affected persons- Widespread perception that "National Security" pursue a partisan-political agenda for incumbent party/regime, as opposed to a "national" agenda
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10. TRANSPORT	A. Overall sector governance and policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disproportionate reliance on road transportation, as other modes of inland transportation (railway, water) have remained undeveloped (water) or left to decay (railways) over the decades. Road transport accounts for 95% of passenger transportation and 98% of freight transport
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Absence of an integrated transport sector master plan
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fragmentation in sector governance, with four ministries handling various transportation sub-sectors (aviation, roads, railways, ports) sector policies, coordination and implementation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Absence of legal framework for developing Public Private Partnerships means reliance on government funding source
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor linkage/coordination between land use and transport planning, resulting in high concentration of settlement and economic activities at locations for siting transportation infrastructure and raising project costs
	B. Roads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Growing unmet demand for urban road infrastructure, fueled by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid urban population growth - Absence of public mass transit - Urban sprawl, creating new peri-urban (informal) settlements - High rate of private car ownership
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contracted road works substantially in excess of budgeted funds, resulting in project completion delays, cost escalation/overruns, and associated chronic delays in meeting payment obligations to contractors 		


		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Weak quality control and enforcement of contracts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor supervision and monitoring of projects and resultant substandard road works - Lack of laboratory facilities at district and regional level to test and certify material quality and integrity - Contractor routinely deliver performance in disregard or default of contracted quality and standards
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local contractors face capacity constraints
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poor project preparation and selection due to political interference
	C. Road safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Absence of sustained program to tackle high rate of road accidents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Estimated 10,000 average road crashes yearly (40% resulting in serious injuries and 1,800 fatalities). Pedestrians comprise over 40% of road fatalities - Poor quality and maintenance of roads and road surfaces - Chronic laxity in enforcement of road safety regulations, in the face of widespread violations especially by commercial road users - Inadequate resourcing of National Road Safety Authority - Inadequate facilities for non-motorized road users - Poor nighttime illumination of roads, including in heavily trafficked areas
	D. Railways	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Encroachment and growth of illegal settlements around defunct rail lines hinders and raises the cost of rehabilitation

11. COVID-19 LESSONS		
	A. Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Capacity of MMDA and local government structures (assembly members, unit committees) to identify, contact or reach targeted communities and households with emergency services, information, and assistance
	B. Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban spatial planning ▪ Property addressing system
	C. Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rural livelihoods ▪ Food security ▪ Agro (food) processing ▪ Youth participation rate in agriculture
	D. Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Industrial policy (domestication of supply chains in basic household and medical supplies) ▪ Support for innovation (research and development)
	E. Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Supply chains for essential medical supplies (gloves, PPEs) ▪ Numbers and spatial distribution of health care personnel ▪ Health infrastructure ▪ Public health education ▪ Preventive and promotive medicine ▪ WASH (water, sanitation, hygiene) ▪ Sanitary conditions at public markets, GPRTU stations, abattoirs
	F. Housing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Nursery/pre-school daycare ▪ Digital/distance learning
	G. Transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban density ▪ Proliferation of slums and informal settlements (characterized by overcrowding, poor water supply and sanitation)
	H. Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mass transit system ▪ National ID system ▪ (In)formalization of the economy ▪ Contingency Fund/planning and budgeting ▪ Revenue mobilization


APPENDIX - AFROBAROMETER TREND DATA

Afrobarometer Round 8 Findings on Policy Priorities and Evaluation of Government Performance


Most important problems | Ghana | 2019




Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (Respondents could give up to three answers.)*



Most important problem | by age | Ghana | 2019




Evaluation of government's economic performance | Ghana | 2002-2019



Respondents were asked: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

Government's performance in fighting corruption | Ghana | 1999-2019




Respondents were asked: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Approval of government performance in public service delivery | Ghana | 2002-2019

	2002	2005	2008	2012	2014	2017	2019	Change 2017-2019 (pct. points)	Change 2002-2019 (pct. points)
Improving basic health services	66%	75%	85%	63%	37%	69%	61%	-8	-5
Addressing educational needs	68%	72%	84%	60%	35%	82%	74%	-8	6
Providing water and sanitation services	60%	60%	64%	48%	32%	64%	56%	-8	-4
Reducing crime	70%	72%	66%	61%	41%	66%	43%	-23	-27
Providing reliable supply of electricity			65%	51%	24%	75%	67%	-8	67

Respondents were asked: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

Popular appraisal of performance of political leaders | Ghana | 2019



Respondents were asked: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% who "approve" or "strongly approve")



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