


ASSESSING COMMUNITY SENSIVITY TO CROSS-BORDER SECURITY IN GHANA

A BASELINE SURVEY



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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
AUPB	African Union's Border Program
CDD-Ghana	Ghana Center for Democratic Development
CEPS	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FBO	Faith Based Organization
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
HSGF	Homeland Study Group Foundation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LED	Local Economic Development
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
NACOC	Narcotic Control Commission
NAFPCVET	National Framework on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSC	Operation Safe Corridor
PSU/EA	Primary Sampling Unit/Enumeration Area
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RVE	Radicalization into Violent Extremism
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN	United Nations
US	United States

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strengthening the integrity of Ghana's borders is essential for the welfare of the nation and its people. National efforts to prevent illegal cross-border activities, including illicit goods, persons and activities require full involvement of all Ghanaians, especially those living in border areas. This has become even more important considering the regional insecurity posed by terrorist groups and violent extremists. It is therefore imperative that residents be sensitized to potential threats associated with irregular cross-border activities that have a potential to facilitate activities of criminal gangs such as terrorists and violent extremist groups. Furthermore, as violent extremism and terrorist activities have become more prevalent in the West African sub-region it is crucial that these threats are considered when examining the functionality of Ghana's border security. In an effort to improve awareness among border communities, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and the US State Department initiated the project entitled "*Enhancing citizen participation in border security*". As part of the project strategies, a baseline survey was conducted by CDD-Ghana within selected border communities to assess the level of awareness regarding border-related threats and gather information on the relationship between border residents and security agencies. The baseline survey was intended to inform the direction and interventions of the broader project. Both border residents and staff of some security agencies were interviewed in each of the 10 regions within where Ghana's land borders are located. Responses from the respondents as well as additional data on the communities in which they reside were recorded and analyzed in this report. The findings of this survey and its attendant report are summarized as follows:

DATA ON BORDER RESIDENTS

Residents living in border communities at both approved and unapproved entry points were surveyed on a number of topics relating to border security in particular, and cross-border activities in general. In total, 601 residents across the 10 regions participated in the study.

Civil Society Organizations

CSOs can play an important role in promoting civil activism, however, 81% of respondents in this survey indicated that they were not aware of any CSOs operating in their community.

- Respondents that were aware of CSOs in their community reported that these groups focused their operations on poverty reduction, health and education, and not much on security.

Community Disputes

The majority of respondents reported that there were no disputes occurring in their communities. Of those who said there were some disputes said chieftaincy disputes were

the most frequently identified form of dispute.

- 68% of participants reported that there were no forms of disputes in their communities
- 15% identified chieftaincy disputes as the most common
- 6% identified communal land disputes as the most common

Crime and Safety

Overall, most respondents indicated that their community was relatively safe and crime-free. Most respondents reported that their community had no watchdog organizations.

- 83% stated that they never feared crime in their own home
- 80% stated that they never felt unsafe walking in their neighborhood
- 60% reported that their community had no watchdog associations, 15% reported the presence of a recognized watchdog group and 25% said they did not know

Relationship Between Residents and Security Personnel

Overall, respondents reported having cordial relationships with all security agencies operating in their communities, a small minority reported hostility, mistrust or confrontation with security personnel. Incidents of violence between security agents and residents were rarely cited. And most residents view security agencies as being helpful.

- 78%-85% of respondents reported that relationships with Immigration Service, Customs, Military and Police were cordial
- 91% reported that there were *never* violent clashes between security agents and residents
- 82% reported that there were *never* violent confrontations between security agents and residents
- Nearly all respondents reported that they had *never* been unlawfully detained, harassed or intimidated by security agents in their community
- 84% of respondents rated security agencies as being helpful or very helpful in their provision of services to residents

Contact with Officials

Residents' contact with local officials was very low, particularly for political party officials and customs officers. Assembly members, religious leaders and traditional leaders were more frequently contacted by residents indicating that individuals may be more comfortable discussing public issues and challenges with these persons.

- 93% never contacted a political party official
- 90% never contacted a customs officer
- 88% never contacted an immigration officer
- 87% never contacted a police officer
- 86% never contacted a religious or traditional leader
- 84% never contacted an assembly man or woman

Cooperation and Reporting Crime

Of the six mechanisms for reporting crimes that were included in the survey questions, most respondents stated that these mechanisms do not exist in their community. The majority of respondents also expressed some level of willingness to collaborate with security agencies to address crime, however, most respondents had never supplied information to any security agency. The primary reason given for willingness to cooperate was the desire for a safer community. For those that expressed unwillingness to collaborate, the most prominent reason given was fear of reprisal from suspected criminals.

Most respondents (between 78%-87%) reported that the following reporting mechanisms were not available:

- Special information desks at the offices of security agencies
- Confidential meetings with agencies
- Confidential information drop boxes
- Discreetly dropping information to agencies
- Secured telephone numbers

Willingness to Provide Information to Security Agencies

- Willing (71%): Always (14%), Often (20%), Sometimes (37%)
- Unwilling (26%): Rarely (6%), Never (20%)

Respondents Who Had Provided Information to Security Agencies: 17%

- Most common mechanisms used for giving information to security agencies were by confidential meetings and secured numbers

Perceived Level of Cooperation Between Residents and Security Agencies

- High Cooperation: 37%
- Moderate Cooperation: 31%
- Low Cooperation: 15%
- Non-Existent: 13%

Engagement Between Security Agencies and Residents

- 23% of respondents said yes there was formal engagement
 - Sometimes (66%), Often (18%), Never (12%), Always (3%)
- 75% of respondents said there was no formal engagement
- Resident Participation in Engagements: Never (79%), Occasionally (15%), Frequently (5%)

Terrorism Awareness and Preparedness

When asked to identify activities associated with terrorism, 10% of respondents indicated they had no knowledge about it. The majority of respondents were aware of recent terrorist activities within the West-African sub-region but a large majority of those

surveyed did not consider Ghana to be under external threat from violent groups and did not see Ghana as being a potential target for terrorists.

- Most respondents (39%) also felt that community awareness about terrorist threats was low
- Most respondents (71%) did not view Ghana as a potential target for terrorists
- An overwhelming majority of participants stated that they had not attended any community sensitization programs on terrorism
- Most respondents expressed satisfaction with the government's management of terrorist threats
- The vast majority of respondents stated that they would very likely report someone if they were seen/heard engaging in terrorist related activities involving weapons, propaganda, etc.
- However, the vast majority (86%) stated they were not likely to report someone who was talking about breaking into a house

Respondents in Volta Region and Oti Region

Due to the heightened secessionist group activities in the last two years in these regions, and the attacks in Volta region in 2020 by the group, additional survey questions were included specifically for residents in these areas.

Awareness of Secessionist Groups

Secessionists' Agenda to Break Away from Ghana to Form Another Country

- The majority of respondents (62%) had heard of the secessionists' agenda
- About half (51%) of respondents felt that residents in their communities were aware of the secessionists' agenda
- 46% of respondents did not believe that collaborators with secessionist groups were across Ghana's international borders, and 37% did not know the location of collaborators. Only 17% believed that collaborators were operating across Ghana's borders.

Respondents who indicated personal and community-level awareness were also asked about the justification given by the group. Lack of development was a common response and underdevelopment underpinned other rationales such as marginalization or a desire for independence.

Support or Opposition to Secessionist Agenda

- 52% of respondents were either completely or somewhat opposed
- 22% of respondents were either completely or somewhat supportive
- 26% were either apathetic to the issue or did not know whether or not they supported it

Interestingly, the highest percentage of respondents (39%) falsely believed that interviewers had been sent by the government to conduct the survey. Only 33% correctly

believed that CDD-Ghana had conducted the survey, despite full disclosure of identity by the CDD-Ghana interviewers.

DATA ON SECURITY SERVICES

Throughout the 60 border communities surveyed, 80 staff from some security agencies were interviewed on the topics of security challenges, relationships with residents and their awareness level on issues of terrorism and violent extremism and preparedness to deal with it in case there was a spill over into Ghana.

Characteristics of Persons Crossing the Border

Most respondents in the survey (47%) indicated that people crossing the border were typically ECOWAS Nationals and 40% of respondents cited local residents. Immigration officials were asked the main reasons why people cross the Ghanaian border; the most common responses were trading (37%), farming (23%), business (14%) and family contacts (13%).

Unapproved Routes

Security personnel were asked several questions regarding unapproved routes for border crossings.

- About half of respondents reported that unapproved routes were accessible all season, while, 41% reported that these routes used were seasonal (may become inaccessible during the rainy season for example)
- The majority of respondents (88%) indicated that unapproved routes were patrolled always, often or sometimes while 11% reported that these routes were rarely or never patrolled

All Ports of Entry

Security personnel were asked series of questions regarding the frequency of conducting patrols and the feasibility of tracking between different ports.

- Most respondents (78%) reported that patrols at all border ports were conducted always or very often
- Only 31% of respondents reported that moving between border posts to monitor the movement of goods and people was “very feasible”

Crime and Law Enforcement

The border communities included in the survey had minimal police presence as reported by respondents. This may indicate that other border security agencies were doing the policing work in addition to their official mandates. The most common crime reported by respondents was smuggling. Most respondents also stated that there were no major disputes within their community.

- 63% of respondents reported that there was no police station or police post in their community
- 53% of respondents cited smuggling as the most common type of crime in their

community followed by theft, illicit border crossings and then armed robbery (11%)

- 56% of respondents reported that there were no disputes in their community, 20% reported chieftaincy disputes and 11% reported land disputes
- 78% of respondents stated that there was no presence of watchdog associations in their community

Relationship Between Residents and Security Agencies

The security agents included in the survey agreed with the residents that the relationship between security personnel and community members was mostly cordial, particularly for Immigration officers and Customs. The respondents, who were mostly Immigration and Customs officers s did not know what the relationship is between residents and military or police officers. However, few respondents reported that the relationship between security personnel and residents was cooperative. Violent clashes or confrontations between residents and security agents were reported to be very rare and nonexistent in most cases.

Residents Reporting Illicit Activities

- 58% of security agents reported that residents report on smuggling activities, sometimes or often, 42% reported that residents never or rarely alerted security agencies of smuggling activities
- 65% reported that residents sometimes or often reported illegal entries while 30% reported that residents never or rarely reported illegal entry of foreigners into the country
- The most common method of reporting illicit activities was discreetly dropping information to security agencies
- Respondents said residents were sometimes willing to provide information to security agencies and the most common justification given for unwillingness to report was fear of reprisal attacks

Engagement Between Citizens and Security Agencies

- The majority of respondents (59%) indicated that there was no formal engagement between the security services and residents
- Of those who reported that there were some formal engagements with residents, most said platforms to discuss security matters occur “sometimes” as opposed to often or always
- When asked whether or not citizens had been sensitized on security issues over the past year, respondents were nearly evenly split (49% yes) and (46% no)

Terrorism Awareness and Preparedness

A majority of respondents agreed that they are aware of the causes, methods and the incentives for terrorism to thrive. Similarly, a majority of respondents agreed that they were aware of various terrorist groups and their objectives. However, a significant percentage of responses indicated low level of awareness for security personnel:

- 36% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I know various terrorist groups and their objectives”
- 38% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “I know the methods of recruitment and tactics of terrorists”

Training, Drills and Preparedness

The majority of respondents (59%) indicated that they had not participated in any counter-terrorism training or drills in the past year, however, a high percentage of respondents (77%) indicated that someone on their team had participated in such activities. When asked about the level of preparedness, most agents felt that they were somewhat (28%) or very (30%) well prepared to deal with terrorist threats. However, 24% felt that they were not so well prepared to contend with terrorist threats and 9% felt that they were not well prepared at all.

Residents Level of Awareness

- **Threats of Terrorism in Ghana**
Security agents were asked to describe the level of awareness of the community regarding the threat of violent extremism, very few reported that there was a high level of awareness (3%). The most common response was that awareness was low (41%), followed by moderate awareness (33%) and 17% reported that there was no awareness at all.
- **Threats of Terrorism from Neighboring Countries**
Security agents were asked to describe the level of awareness of residents in terms of threats from neighboring countries. The most common response was that awareness was low (55%), about 29% reported that awareness was moderate and 10% reported that there was no level of awareness at all. Only 3% of respondents felt that awareness of threats from neighboring countries was high.
- **Efforts to Sensitize citizens on terrorism threats and security awareness**
Most (69%) of respondents said that no efforts had been made to sensitize residents on these issues.

Challenges Faced by Security Agencies

Numerous challenges for security agencies were identified, some of the more prominent ones were:

- Limited or delayed funding
- Insufficient personnel
- Lack of accommodation, vehicles and border post structures
- Poor telecommunication connectivity and lack of other communication technologies
- Poor public infrastructure and poor road network

AMENITIES IN SURVEYED COMMUNITIES

Additional information was collected on the availability of services, facilities and other community amenities.

- *Services*
Mobile phone services and electricity were widely available in all communities surveyed, whereas piped water wasn't available in 64% of these communities. The majority (90%) of these communities were lacking a sewage system.
- *Facilities*
Most of the communities surveyed were lacking police stations, schools, post offices and market stalls. Health clinics were more common, but still missing from 40% of the communities. There were transport services and some kind of money transfer facilities in most of the communities surveyed.
- *Security*
Most communities lacked security checkpoints and vehicles. Roadblocks, presence of soldiers, police officers and army/police vehicles were all unavailable in 75%-80% of communities. Customs checkpoints were more common and were found in 61% of surveyed communities.
- *Roads*
The majority of roads were feeder roads, with few paved roads and a negligible percentage of gravel or tarred roads. Almost half (48%) of roads were reported to be in “very poor” condition and only 15% were reported to be in good or very good condition. The rest were marked as fair or poor with 2% being recorded as “unusable”.

CONCLUSION

Communications

The ability to disseminate timely information and communicate intelligence information quickly for action to be taken are crucial aspects of maintaining effective border security. Although respondents indicated high access and usage of telecommunications networks along the borders, the quality of calls, data and internet connectivity was relatively poor. Telecommunication companies should work to improve their services in these communities and provide higher quality access to these resources. However, strong access and consumption of radio was reported and radio should therefore be considered as a valuable tool for public sensitization and disseminating timely information regarding border issues.

Civil Society Organizations

In order to combat the threats of terrorism and violent extremism, all sectors of society should be engaged in these efforts and Civil Society Organizations can play a key role in engaging stakeholders to build awareness and resilience. Unfortunately, very few CSOs

were reported to be operating in these communities and of those that do exist, most were not focused on security related activities. Partnerships with CSOs should be pursued through training and capacity-building so that these organizations could strengthen resilience and preparedness in the border communities in which they operate.

Relationship Between Residents and Security Agencies

Both sets of respondents, security personnel and residents, indicated that interactions with one another were relatively peaceful with few instances of violence or friction. This cordial relationship leaves room for strengthening the relationship to one of mutual trust and cooperation, as most respondents did not indicate a relationship where residents and security agents work together to improve the safety and security of border communities. Moving towards a cooperative environment is crucial for counter terrorism efforts.

Security Personnel

While most security agents reported some knowledge of terrorism and violent extremism, this level of education for personnel should be enhanced and integrated into training curriculums as a priority issue to ensure that all security agents are well versed on the subject. The security officials who were interviewed also reported that the logistical capacity of their operations limits their preparedness to respond to any agent calls, and they were not too sure if they could effectively deal with threats of terrorism. Security agencies should be better equipped to detect and respond to potential threats along the borders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Education and Inclusion of Residents

Regular Engagements: Security agencies should work with assembly members, traditional authorities and other local stakeholders to hold regular community engagements educating residents on security issues and connecting them with their security agencies

Radio Outreach: Utilize radio connectivity to broadcast important information about the different layers of security and the role citizens play in their own community security.

Opportunities: Create alternative sources of income for residents through local economic development to curb illicit activities such as smuggling

Community Participation

Volunteers: Security agencies should identify volunteers and train them to be peer educators equipped with basic security tips. Volunteers should also be trained to form community watchdog associations

Partnerships: Local authorities and opinion leaders should be engaged as well as schools, mosques, churches and other organizations to partner with security agencies to sensitize residents about the dangers of cross border crimes and threats of violent extremism

Reporting Hotline: Dedicated telephone number for community members to call in and report criminal activity

Security Agency Personnel

Training: Counter-terrorism strategies should be included in basic training for personnel alongside regular refresher training programs

Community Trust: Personnel should conduct themselves in a professional and ethical manner by respecting strict confidentiality and not accepting bribes; this would engender a better cooperative relationship with residents

Resourcing and capacitating Security Agencies

Allocate Necessary Resources: Provision of accommodations, guns, ammunition and other border patrol equipment for personnel at the borders. Establish fences and walls along the border, particularly at unapproved entry points

Improve Border Community Infrastructure: Extend electricity to bases of security personnel and build police stations in the communities which do not currently have one. In order to reduce the incentives for violent extremism, it is essential to improve public services for vulnerable communities and ameliorate grievances which may otherwise pave the way for terrorist ideology.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Many African countries have the daunting task of manning their borders effectively, which has broader implications for security. Following the 2011 Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya and the subsequent internal crisis in Mali in 2012, many critical questions have been raised for countries on border management (Lamprey, 2013), as many countries in North and West Africa focused on building the architecture of their border security (Herbert, 2021). This has primarily been due to the shifting dynamics from long-standing smuggling problems which had bedeviled borders in the Maghreb, to challenges of securing borders from drug, weapons, and human trafficking. Coupled with these complex challenges is an increase in terrorist activities and the accompanying interplay of terrorist recruitment and movement with ease across borders and the benefits that terrorist networks gain from the booming illicit trade across these vast porous borders (Hanlon and Herbert, 2015). In assessing the porous nature of borders in West Africa, Lamprey (2013) highlighted the near absence of detection equipment and scanners at border posts; customs administrations lacking national databases of offenders, their networks and the nature and volume of contraband seized; and understaffed agencies and undermotivated staff who do not effectively collaborate and coordinate at the national and regional levels, as some of the issues that confront states in their efforts to protect their borders.

Within Ghana's context of porous borders and many unapproved entry points, Sosu (2011) identified among institutional limitations in terms of poor border infrastructure and facilities, gaps in capacity building of agents to effectively deliver on their mandate, and lack of public awareness, particularly among border residents of the proper use of the borders. The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), is mandated through the Immigration Service Act, 2016 (Act 908) with the responsibility of managing and patrolling the borders of the country. However, GIS faces a lot of challenges in its efforts at ensuring safety at the various entry points of the nation. It is saddled with inadequate personnel to patrol the borders, inadequate logistics and equipment such as firearms for officers, even though GIS was recently given legal backing to handle weapons (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2016). Attempts by security agents to enforce the law against commodity smuggling and aiding 'strangers' to cross the border come as a threat to the livelihoods of border residents (IOM, 2016; Hlovor, 2018). In some instances, this sparks violent confrontations between security agents and residents and constrains security agents' ability to build cooperative relations with communities along the borders (IOM, 2016).

Inadequate border fencing and the nature of settlements along most of Ghana's borders enable uninhibited movement of goods and persons across the borders. Owing to this, criminals and contraband goods including weapons are smuggled into the country with little possibility of detection. Indeed, the 2016 World Drug Report named Ghana among the top cocaine transit points in the world (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2016).

In the midst of all these border security challenges that Ghana is grappling with, lies the ever-growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa that trickled down from North Africa and the Sahel (*directly from jihadists in Mali*), and that has taken center-stage in Burkina Faso and threatens to spill over into Coastal West African states – Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast and Ghana (Matongbada, 2018; Zenn 2018). The extent of this looming threat is captured by the United Nations (2020) which estimated that deaths associated with terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger increased from 770 in 2016 to more than 4000 in 2019, a five-fold increase over the period. Since Cote d'Ivoire witnessed an attack masterminded by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) at the Grand Bassam in 2016, there have been a number of recent attacks on separate positions on its border with Burkina Faso. Ghana's neighbours to the east, Benin and Togo have not been spared either, experiencing spillover attacks on military outposts on their northern borders with Burkina Faso.

Although Ghana has not experienced a terrorist attack yet, the country is not immune to the threat of external attacks, terrorist financing operations and the possibility that Ghana could become a safe haven for terrorists in the sub-region (Sosu, 2011). Indeed, some recorded incidents in Burkina Faso have happened in close proximity to Ghana's borders (Zenn, 2018) and is a cause for concern and concerted action from all stakeholders in the state to prevent violent extremists and terrorists from infiltrating the country. Owing to these developments, Zenn (2018) strikes a cautionary tone in what he describes as, “*The spillover and expansion of jihadist activity from Mali into Burkina Faso and now from there toward the borders of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin is a trend worth monitoring. Once across the borders, the jihadists will likely seek their fellow kin ethnically or ideologically as well as other communities that are alienated or politically marginalized where jihadist narratives of Muslim-Christian rivalry can resonate.*”

In seeking solutions to mitigate the above-mentioned threats, it is important to answer the following questions regarding Ghana's border communities:

- Are residents aware of the risks and vulnerabilities that the nation is exposed to from violent extremism?
- What is the level of security awareness or consciousness of border residents?
- Is there a good relationship between residents in border communities and security

services?

- What is the level of engagement between and among residents of border communities and security agencies?

The Ghana Center for Democratic Development, with support from the US State Department through the US Embassy in Ghana seeks to support the national agenda to deal with the threats of terrorism and violent extremism. The interventions will seek to elicit answers to the above questions and create platforms that will seek to educate citizens, and raise their awareness level on security issues. The project titled “*Enhancing citizen participation in border security*” was implemented in selected border districts in Ghana between September 2019 and March 2022. The overall goal of the project aimed at improving the security awareness of citizens along border communities as a proactive step towards improving Ghana's border security in the face of surging cross-border crimes and external security threats in West Africa. As part of the interventions under this project, CDD-Ghana conducted a baseline survey in sampled border communities to gain insights on broad themes that relate among other things, to security awareness, terrorism awareness in border communities and the relationship between border residents and security agencies to inform the interventions of the project.

Objectives of the baseline

The primary objective of the baseline was to gather adequate data to inform knowledge about issues of security and terrorism awareness at Ghana's border communities to feed into project design, implementation and advocacy. More specifically, the goals of the baseline survey were to:

1. Gather general information about Ghana's border communities (including availability of telecommunications networks, radio networks and civil society organizations)
2. Assess security challenges and resident-security agency relationship
3. Assess the level of engagement between security agencies and citizens
4. Assess the level of trust between residents and security agencies; and
5. Assess the level of terrorism awareness and preparedness for both security agencies and citizens

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

INTRODUCTION

This section of the report attempts to provide conceptual underpinnings for the various concepts within which this research is situated. These include establishing clarity between the concepts of border management and border security, terrorism, violent extremism, counter terrorism, distinguishing between countering and preventing violent extremism, radicalization and de-radicalization

Distinguishing between border management and border security

The region of West Africa encompasses 35 international borders. In the past decades, many international, regional, and national governments have attempted to address the linkages between border porosity and vulnerability to threats to national and regional peace and security. The African Union's Border Programme (AUBP) defines *border management* as “government functions [...] with the aim of controlling and regulating the flow of people and goods across a country's border/boundary in the national interest,” which can involve “economic development, security and peace” (Okumu 2011, p. 3). Researcher Wafula Okumu identifies the issue of *border security* as one aspect of border management, typically involving the government functions specifically aimed at addressing any activity occurring across or adjacent to international borders that poses a threat to international peace and security (Okumu 2011, Lamptey 2013, p. 2).

On account of their increasingly transnational character and impact, efforts to combat and prevent threats such as terrorism and violent extremism has become closely intertwined with these issues of border management and security. In 2006, the General Assembly Resolution A/60/288 identified terrorism as “one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” (United Nations 2006, A/60/288). The Resolution also identifies many strategic goals and commitments to “resolving the outstanding issues related to the legal definition and scope of the acts covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective instrument to counter-terrorism” (United Nations 2006, A/60/288). In the 2016 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon held that an international response must identify both the links and divergences between terrorism and violent extremism (United Nations 2016, A/20/67). While often used interchangeably in mass media, the phenomena of terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization are distinct and independently complex. In order to appropriately respond to the threats they pose to international, regional, and national security, the phenomena must both be independently defined and conceptualized in relation to one another.

Defining the concept of Terrorism

From a purely linguistic approach, *terrorism* has been broadly defined as the act of instilling 'extreme fear' (Saul, 2019). The African Union (AU)'s 2002 Anti-Terrorism Plan of Action, call for more harmony between existing “legal frameworks pertaining to the prevention and combating of terrorism”. While not legally binding, the AU plan refers to the earlier Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The Convention, adopted in 1999, defines a “terrorist act” as one that violates domestic criminal laws and damages or threatens to damage any number of persons, property, natural resources, or cultural heritage sites with an explicit intention to “intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce, or induce any government, body, institution, the general public, or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint”.

Reaching a consensus definition for terrorism has also been an objective of many academics in related fields. In the Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, Saul (Saul, 2019, p. 36) notes that there already exists a “basic legal consensus that terrorism is criminal violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organization.” The author further notes that many use the label of terrorism to apply to any “instrumental political killing of civilians in peacetime” (Saul 2019, p. 46). While there may be a consensus at the most basic level of the definition, most national governments independently add conditions such as “political, religious, or ideological” motives or grant exceptions for “just causes” of liberation or rebellion (Saul 2019, p. 36). Saul argues that the large breadth of national discretion in defining and addressing terrorism likely hinders the development of more effective and sustainable international responses. He ultimately recommends the development of a more specific consensus definition for terrorism to “facilitate transnational cooperation” and “plug gaps in the existing ad hoc sectoral counter-terrorism treaties” (Saul 2019, p. 45).

Legal Scholar Reuven Young similarly sees a minimum core definition of terrorism within existing international law. However, he argues that this core definition is already more specific than that noted in the Oxford Handbook. According to Young's definition, which he derives from the overlap of existing internationally-ratified conventions and legal frameworks, terrorism entails “the serious harming or killing of non-combatant civilians and the damaging of [public] property” with the intent to “intimidat[e] a group of people or a population or to coerce a government or international organization” (Young 2006, p.64). Young adds that to be characterized as terrorism, an act must be “independently unlawful, [...] intentional, and its consequences must at least be foreseen and desired” and “perpetrated by a sub-state actor” (Young 2006, p.64).

Many argue that the difficulty in reaching a consensus definition for terrorism comes from the wide range of objectives different actors have in formulating one. Lawyers often formulate legal definitions with prosecution in mind, and politicians frequently instrumentalize such terms for tactical reasons. On the other hand, many social scientists see definitions as a way to develop sociological or psychological understandings of harmful phenomena to prevent their proliferation (Meisels, 2009). Some, like Charles

Tilly, argue that while the term “terror” may recall a political strategy that has recurred over time and contexts, it is fundamentally “imprecisely bounded” (Tilly 2004, p. 4). With this recognition, Tilly defines terrorism as an “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle operating within some current regime” (Tilly 2004, p.5).

Terrorism in Ghana's Legal Framework:

Ghana's 2008 Anti-Terrorism Act prohibits terrorist acts, defined as one “performed in furtherance of a political, ideological, religious, racial, or ethnic cause” that “causes serious bodily harm to a person; causes serious damage to property; endangers a person's life; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public” employs a manner of destructive weapons including firearms and explosives, “is prejudicial to national security; [and] is designed or intended to cause damage to essential infrastructure” (Republic of Ghana, 2008, Act 762 pp.3-4). The definition presented in this Act has informed much of the country's later national security policy documents, including its 2020 National Security Strategy, the 2021 Cyber Security Act, and a handbook on Preventing Violent Extremism in Ghana. More recently, the 2019 National Framework on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana (NAFPCVET) refers to Act 762 but defines terrorism as “politically-motivated criminal violence perpetrated by clandestine groups domestically and internationally” (Ministry of National Security 2019, p.9). The definition provided by the government of Ghana is similar to that provided by other international and regional legal definitions in its emphasis on intention and its qualification of perpetrators as “clandestine,” thus separating them from the realm of the state.

The concept of Counter-terrorism

With the contested nature of defining terrorism alone, it is unsurprising that *counter-terrorism* similarly lacks a universal conceptualization. Under the umbrella of its 2006 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the UN includes measures “to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” “to prevent and combat terrorism,” “to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism” and “to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism” (United Nations 2006, A/60/288). The African Union includes similar measures within its existing counter-terrorism frameworks, specifically those “aimed at preventing and combating terrorist acts” (Organization of African Unity, 1999, p. 5). While some regional frameworks like those of the AU mention prevention as one par of broader strategies of counterterrorism, historically, counter-terrorism strategy has been heavily militarized, focused on directly combatting active terrorist organizations as well as prosecuting terrorist acts. This was especially true following the United States' declaration of its so-called Global War on Terror following the attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 (Botha and Graham 2021). According to a literature review conducted by scholars Sven Botha and Suzanne E. Graham, around a decade after the attacks, international norms started shifting away from a solely militarized response to terrorism to a more comprehensive approach focused on socioeconomic drivers of terrorist

organizational development recruitment and on the countering and prevention of violent extremism (Botha and Graham 2021, p. 140).

Defining the Concept of Violent Extremism

The 2016 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism defines *violent extremism* as “conducive to terrorism” but notes that it “is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition.” Ultimately, establishing such a definition is left to the discretion of individual member states, so long as such definitions are “consistent with their obligations under international law (United Nations, A/20/67). The African Union's 2014 Report to the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa identifies it as a factor contributing to the spread of terrorism, occurring when “terrorist groups exploit and capitalize on social grievances, unresolved conflicts, personal or community identity claims, religion, history, marginalization, exclusion, and a host of other factors, to produce an ideological narrative that creates an enabling environment for recruitment and radicalization, where the commission of terrorist acts becomes appealing as an instrument of political activism” (African Union 2014, p.4). In a review of existing literature on the topic of preventing violent extremism, authors Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier note that violent extremism also has varying implications when used to refer to ideas or to actions in differing contexts (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier, 2021, p.348).

Violent Extremism in Ghana's Legal Framework

Ghana's 2019 Framework on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism defines violent extremism as “justification, support, and use of violence to achieve a goal, normally political, social, religious or ideological” (Ministry of National Security 2019, p.9). The country's 2020 Security and Intelligence Act on the other hand defines it as “the belief and action of a person who supports or uses ideologically-motivated violence to further radical ideological, religious, or political aims” (Republic of Ghana 2020, Act 1030, p.25). Ghana's 2020 National Security Strategy identifies violent extremism as a Tier 1: High Impact risk to the country's national security interests (Ministry of National Security 2020, p.30).

Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism: Comparing Approaches

In the UN's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon emphasizes that the idea of prevention should be a focus of international responses to violent extremism and terrorism. Prevention is also listed first among the four pillars included in Ghana's National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism. While motivated by similar intentions and often combined into single policy documents such as the Framework, there are benefits to differentiating between the two approaches: Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Scholars tend to point out that while CVE is rooted in conventional national security frameworks, PVE is more focused on “improving citizenship education and addressing issues such as marginalization and discrimination that are suggested to be drivers of violent extremism” (Stephens et al. 2021, p. 347).

Randy Borum, a scholar of security studies, holds that “a successful effort to counter violent extremism (CVE) must attempt to stem the tide of new extremists” (Borum 2011, p.8). These approaches often focus on identifying social phenomena such as radicalization to stop them from leading to the proliferation of violent extremism. However, those in favour of PVE approaches argue that more securitized approaches to addressing such threats can have detrimental outcomes, contributing to stigmatization and social ostracization that may ultimately increase motivations to join certain terrorist groups or become involved with other forms of organized crime (Stephens et al., 2021).

The Concepts of Radicalization and De-Radicalization

Counter-terrorism, CVE, and PVE strategies often mention the process of *radicalization* or the possession of radical viewpoints as factors contributing to the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism across borders. Stephens et al. (2021) define radicalization as “a process through which groups or individuals grow in commitment to engage in conflict, adopting more radical or extreme positions” (Stephens et al., 2021, 348). However, most governments have adopted their own unique definitions. Much literature has implied a causal relationship between radicalization and violent extremism, leading to the creation of the concept of Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE) (Borum, 2011). This concept has led to the formulation of strategies designed to both interrupt and even reverse the radicalization process, frequently referred to as de-radicalization. In Ghana's 2020 National Security Strategy, these include the “develop[ment] of anti-radicalisation programmes with alternative narratives to preemptively dissuade the youth from tendencies of radicalization through extremist teaching and misinterpretation of religious text” (Ministry of National Security 2020, p. 39).

Alex P. Schmid of the International Centre for Counter-terrorism comprehensively defines radicalization as a “process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging” (Schmid 2013, p. 18). In the past, literature has focused on preventing radicalization by identifying factors leading to radicalization; among those frequently cited include personal and political grievances, perceived harms, want for recognition, or search for identity (Stephens et al. 2013). However, more recent scholarship has focused on how to initiate a process of *de-radicalization*, beginning by seeking to understand why individuals depart from terrorist organizations or reject previously-held violent extremist views (Borum, 2011). In a chapter from the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Kurt Braddock defines de-radicalization as “the weakening or loss of beliefs and attitudes that support the use of terrorism” (Braddock 2018, pp.464). John Horgan more narrowly defines it as “the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity” (Horgan as cited in Islam 2019, p. 6).

Yemen is commonly cited as the first country to formally adopt a de-radicalization programme in 2002. The programme, known as “Committee for Dialogue,” focused on trying to “change the radical ideological beliefs” of Muslim prison detainees through re-education with “charismatic Islamic scholars [who] tried to guide them back into a nonviolent version of Islam that did not embrace militant jihadi ideals” (Islam 2019, p. 9; Speckhard 2020, p. 4). The programme was relatively unsuccessful, and many detainees who had participated later volunteered to join other groups and conflicts, including that of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Speckhard 2020, p. 4). In the West African region, Nigeria similarly piloted a de-radicalization programme in a prison context in 2015, eventually expanding it to former members of the armed group Boko Haram in a programme known as Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) (Ehiane 2019, p. 130). A review of the programme, conducted in 2019, argued that its narrow focus on re-education, rather than on other factors contributing towards radicalization and recruitment, has limited its success. The review of the Nigerian case concluded that successful de-radicalization programs require governments to improve the facilities and manpower needed for implementation, ensure adaptability for the variety of factors leading individuals to join violent armed groups, and “appreciate the role of the community where the programme is situated” to ensure individuals are well-received and sustainably re-integrated into society” (Ehiane 2019, p. 135).

Conclusion

The issues facing border communities in West Africa today are also facing communities across the globe. Nevertheless, difficulties in defining threats such as terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization make developing an international or even regional strategy to prevent their proliferation and mitigate harm an increasingly difficult task. However, while a legal definition may not exist for such phenomena, significant international normative shifts have occurred in the past several decades. Pre-existing highly militarized and reactive counter-terrorism approaches have been replaced by frameworks urging prevention. These frameworks both identify the unique processes that contribute to violent extremist and terrorist violence and the security threats they pose, while also noting their relationship, hoping to develop solutions better suited to maintaining livelihoods and stable communities without resorting to military force.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This section of the report highlights the methodology which was adopted for the study and sheds light on the target population of the study, sample procedures and sample size, data collection method and instrument design.

Target Population

The survey focused on border communities on Ghana's territory and was interested in the perspectives of two categories of respondents – residents and security agencies. The first category of respondents were residents who had lived in the border communities for more than 12 months prior to the period of the survey and were 18 years old and above. Persons below the age of 18 years are considered special and protected, and the study therefore focused on the adult population. Security agents from the various agencies stationed in border communities were considered as the second category of respondents. Within this category, only those who had been deployed and worked in the community for about 12 months and beyond were of interest. The reason for restricting the target population to this duration of stay in the community for 12 months or more is because that duration would provide enough time for respondents to give an assessment of the security situation within the community in which they reside. In addition to this, there were a number of questions that required the target group to reflect on the things that happened in the previous 12 months. Hence, the target population who had lived and or worked in that particular border community for at least 12 months have adequate knowledge and experiences to respond appropriately to the survey questions.

Sample procedures and sample size

A list of all border posts, crossings and their locations (approved and unapproved routes) were sourced from the Ghana Immigration Service. This was constructed into a sample frame from which the total number of communities were selected for the study. A total number of 60 border communities were sampled out of close to 250. This selection was done using random sampling procedures to give an equal chance of selection to each of the communities. Out of the 60 communities, 20 were approved entry points and 40 were unapproved (Table 1). Respondent selection procedures are explained below based on the two categories of respondents:

- (a) Residents: In each community 10 residents were selected, provided that they met the criteria outlined above, and also agreed to participate after the purpose of the survey had been explained and their informed consent had been sought. This

brought the total number of residents interviewed for this survey to 601.

- (b) Security Agents: A similar approach of convenience sampling was used to select security agents at the various border communities who were on duty. No quota was set for this category of respondents because there was no certainty about the number of security agents that could be found at each post. However, security agents who were available, met the criteria and were interested in the survey were interviewed. In all 88 respondents from the security agencies were interviewed for the survey.

In essence, a total of 689 respondents from among residents and security agents located in selected border communities in the country were interviewed during the survey.

Table 1: Number of Sampled Communities

Region	Approved	Unapproved	Total
Western	2	5	7
Western North	2	5	7
Northern	1	3	4
North East	1	2	3
Upper East	2	1	3
Bono	3	5	8
Volta	6	12	18
Oti	1	0	1
Savannah	1	3	4
Upper West	1	4	5
Total	20	40	60

Source: Survey data (2021)

Data Collection Methods

The study is primarily a baseline survey and had to rely on primary data collection techniques to elicit responses from respondents. A face-to-face interviewing approach was used to obtain information from the target population – residents and security agents.

Instrument Design

Questionnaires were used as the data collection instrument to solicit information from the respondents. The questionnaire had a significant majority of the questions being closed-ended with pre-determined answer options for respondents to choose from. However, there were just a few open-ended questions to allow the respondents to give an opinion without being restricted to pre-determined answer options. Two instruments were designed separately for residents and security agents respectively. Each of the questionnaires had distinct questions that related to their respective respondents due to the varying experiences of civilians on the one hand and security agents on the other. However, there were some specific questions that overlapped for both residents and security agencies in order to compare their respective opinions on the phenomenon, and to ascertain the variances or consistencies in their responses.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF DATA ON BORDER RESIDENTS

INTRODUCTION


The baseline survey was conducted in 10 regions out of the 16 regions primarily because the land borders of the country are located in these 10 regions. In all the regions and border communities, respondents were selected from among two categories, that is, residents and security agencies. This report focuses on the analysis and perspectives of residents living in border communities across the country. The discussions are structured under the following themes: general information about the respondents and communities; security challenges and resident-security agencies' relationship; trust between residents and security agencies; engagement between security agencies and citizens; terrorism awareness and preparedness; and some specific questions for only residents in the Volta and Oti regions due to the secessionist groups active in that part of the country. The report concluded with an overview of observed services, facilities, security presence and the nature of roads in and around border communities.

SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS AND COMMUNITIES

Demography of respondents

The largest group of respondents (27%) fell within the age range of 36 – 45 years and this was followed by those in the 26 – 35 years age bracket (23%) and the youngest age cohort (18 – 25) constituted just about one-fifth (19%). Respondents over 65 years of age were in the minority group of about 1 in 20 respondents (4%) (Figure A).


Figure A: Age of respondents



Source: Survey data (2021)

Majority (57%) of persons interviewed were males whilst their female counterparts constituted 43 percent (Figure B).


Figure B: Gender of respondents



Source: Survey data (2021)

Less than 1 in 3 (26%) respondents have completed or partially completed junior high school which was 2 percentage points higher than those who had completed or partially completed senior high school (24%). Those who had no formal or informal education made up about a quarter of the sample (24%). Those who had completed or had some tertiary education collectively were less than one-fifth (13%) of all respondents in the survey (Figure C).


Figure C: Respondents education level



Source: Survey data (2021)

Majority of respondents noted they had a job that paid cash income, out of which half (50%) of all respondents had a full-time job and a little above one-tenth (13%) said they were doing part time jobs. Among those who did not have jobs that paid cash income, 15 percent were looking for jobs while a little over one-fifth (22%) were not looking for jobs (Figure D). Majority (39%) of respondents were engaged in the Agriculture / Farming / Fishing / Forestry sector. This was followed by Traders / Hawkers / Vendors who constituted 16 percent of all respondents. About 1 in 20 (6%) of respondents indicated they never had a job (Table 2).

Figure D: Do you have a job that pays cash income?



Source: Survey data (2021)

Table 2: Main Occupation of Respondents


Main Occupation	Percent
Agriculture / Farming / Fishing / Forestry	39%
Trader / Hawker / Vendor	16%
Never had a job	6%
Artisan or skilled manual worker (eg. trades like electrician etc)	6%
Student	5%
Retail / Shop	5%
Mid-level professional (eg. teacher, nurse, mid-level government worker	5%
Other	5%
Driver/Okada rider	3%
Unskilled manual worker (e.g. cleaner, laborer, domestic help)	3%
Dressmaker/beautician/barber	2%
Housewife / homemaker	2%
Clerical or secretarial	1%

Source: Field Survey (2021)

Location of respondents

Without contest, the largest group of respondents (30%) were residents within the Volta region. Data on the number of entry points along the country's border reveals that Volta region has the most points of entry, and it is based on this distribution that border communities were sampled for this survey. For this reason, the Volta region had the highest number of respondents. The Bono region followed at a distance with a little over one-tenth (13%), one percentage point higher than the Western North (12%) and Western regions (12%) respectively. The regions with the least number of respondents were Oti (2%), North East (5%) and Upper East (5%) respectively (Figure 1).


Figure 1: Regional distribution of respondents



Source: Field survey (January 2021)

In terms of the distribution of respondents at the district level, Ketu North in the Volta region had the highest number of residents participating in the baseline survey followed by Jaman North in Bono region (12%) and Jomoro in the Western region (12%). The following districts had the least number of residents with each representing two-percentage points of all residents interviewed: Kassena Nankana West (Upper East), Kadjebi (Oti), Tatale-Sanguli (Northern), Ho Municipal (Volta) and Dormaa West (Bono) (Figure 2).


Figure 2: Distribution of respondents by districts



Source: Survey data (2021)


With regards to the location of respondents, most residents (67%) who participated in the survey were located in border communities with unapproved entry points whereas the remaining (33%) resided in border communities that were designated as approved entry points (Figure 3). Residents were asked how long they had stayed in their respective border communities, and the responses were varied. Those who had stayed in the community for over 31 years constituted the majority (27%) while those in the range of 2 to 5 years were the next largest category (16%). Conversely, those who had stayed in their respective communities for just about 1 year were fewest in number (1%). It is interesting to note that residents who had lived in the communities for between 26 and 30 years were less than one-third (8%) of those who had stayed for more than 31 years in their communities (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Category of border community



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 4: Length of stay of residents in the community




Source: Survey data (2021)

Mobile Networks in Border Communities

Respondents were asked about the availability of mobile networks in their communities and the quality of reception associated with voice and data or internet connectivity. Overall, less than half of respondents (42%) indicated that MTN network was available in their communities and that happened to be the most frequently cited network. The other prominent networks as cited by respondents are Vodafone (30%) and Airtel Tigo (22%). Reception of networks from neighbouring countries was 4-percentage points higher than Glo which had the least (1%) representation (Figure 5).


Figure 5: Mobile networks in border communities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Closely related are residents' assessment of the quality of reception for the various networks, a little over 1 in six respondents (63%) described MTN's reception quality as 'Very good or good' and this superseded Airtel Tigo (47%) and Vodafone (45%). Slightly more than one-third of residents (35%) described Vodafone's reception quality as 'fair' and it was over and above the other networks in that category. In contrast, there was not much difference between ratings for "very poor or poor" reception quality among the various networks since this description was given by between 14 percent and 18 percent of residents for each network provider (Figure 6).


Figure 6: Quality of mobile network reception



Source: Survey data (2021)

Assessment of data or internet connectivity was generally on a lower side as can be seen in Figure 7. Generally, less than half of respondents indicated that the quality of data or internet connectivity of the various networks was 'Very good or good'. Further disaggregation shows that MTN (47%) and Glo (45%) were rated better by residents than the other networks including those from neighbouring countries which were almost at par, ranging from 31 percent to 33 percent. On the flip side, as much as a little over one-third of residents indicated they 'Don't know' the nature of the internet or data connectivity of the various networks along the borders. This can be interpreted to mean that respondents did not use these networks and or they used non-smartphones and therefore could not tell the quality of data or internet connectivity.


Figure 7: Quality of data or internet connectivity of mobile networks



Source: Survey data (2021)

Various studies have shown that radio is the prime source of information for most citizens in Africa. The study sought to find out if radio stations were located in the communities surveyed, and it was revealed that just about one-fifth (19%) had radio stations located in the communities while a large majority (79%) had no radio station (Figure 8). An additional question enquired whether the signal of a radio station located outside of the community was received within the community. This time however, an overwhelming majority (85%) affirmed that 'yes' they received radio signals from stations located in other communities (Figure 9).


Figure 8: Location of radio station in the community | Figure 9: Signals from radio stations outside the community



Source: Survey data (2021)


Building partnerships with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) at the local level is essential in promoting civil activism. In view of this, respondents were asked to indicate whether they knew about any CSOs operating within their catchment area to which 8 in 10 respondents (81%) indicated there were 'no' CSOs in their communities. On the other hand, a little over one-tenth (13%) noted their awareness of CSOs working in their communities (Figure 10). Out of the category which indicated 'Yes', they were of the view that these CSOs mainly focused their engagements on poverty reduction (18%), health (16%) and education (16%) and to a lesser extent on crime and security (7%) as illustrated in Figure 11.

Figure 10: Civil Society Organization (CSOs) working in the communities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 11: CSOs area of engagement




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 2: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RESIDENT-SECURITY AGENCIES' RELATIONSHIP

This section of the report assesses from residents what they consider to be security challenges within their communities, and their perspectives on the existing relationship between the residents and security agencies operating in the area.

Residents were asked to indicate the kind of disputes raging in the communities in which they reside. As illustrated in Figure 12, almost 7 in ten (68%) were of the view that there was no form of disputes in the communities in which they reside. However, chieftaincy disputes (15%) and communal land disputes (6%) were cited by respondents as the most common forms of disputes raging in their communities (Figure 12).


Figure 12: Disputes raging in the communities



Source: Survey data (2021)

A large majority of respondents indicated that in the last 12 months they had never feared crime in their own homes (83%) and/or never felt unsafe in their neighbourhood (80%). However, a small minority of about one-tenth of the respondents expressed contrary opinions. Nine percent of respondents said they fear crime in their own homes 'just once or twice' during that period while less than 1 in ten (6%) selected 'several times' as the frequency with which they feared crime in their own home. Juxtaposing how often residents felt unsafe in their neighbourhood, just about one-tenth (11%) indicated 'just once or twice' and a slightly lower number (6%) said 'several times'.

Figure 13: Fear of crime at home and feeling unsafe in neighbourhood




Source: Survey data (2021) The questions were asked: In the past 12 months, how often, if ever have you or anyone in your family (a) Felt unsafe walking in your neighbourhood? (b) Feared crime in your own home?

Residents were asked to describe how they conceived of the relationship between residents living along the borders and security agencies such as personnel of the Ghana Immigration Service, Customs, the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service. The nature of this relationship between residents and the various security agencies is described in Figure 14. Most respondents described the relationship between residents and personnel of the security agencies as 'cordial' and this ranged between 78% and 85%. Among the four security agencies listed, the favorable rating was highest for the relationship between residents and Immigration personnel (85%) and personnel of Customs (85%). Less than one-tenth of respondents described the relationship between security agents and residents as being hostile, and this was true across all agencies: Immigration (6%); Ghana Armed Forces (6%); Customs (5%) and the Ghana Police Service (5%).

Beyond getting a description of how respondents perceived the relationship between security agencies and residents, another question was posed to respondents which sought to establish the occurrence of incidents of violent confrontation and violent clashes between the two categories of stakeholders in border communities in the last 12 months. Eight in ten (82%) respondents were of the view that they 'never' witnessed any violent confrontation between residents and any of the security agents, while 7 percent indicated that they rarely witnessed any such incident. A minority group (8%) noted that 'sometimes' there were violent confrontations between residents and security agents. Closely related in this assessment is a whopping majority (91%) of respondents who indicated that they 'never' witnessed a violent clash between residents and security agents


in their communities as opposed to only 4 percent who opined that 'sometimes' there were violent clashes (Figure 15). With respect to the underlying reasons for either the violent confrontation or violent clashes, respondents cited issues that related to security agents at the borders preventing residents from crossing over into neighbouring countries, mainly as a result of enforcing the President's directive on closure of borders due to COVID-19. Another reason that featured prominently were altercations that emanated over the issue of citizenship and restriction of perceived foreigners during the 2020 voter registration exercise. In some instances, respondents mentioned that amorous relationships involving security officers and residents triggers the violent confrontations or clashes.

Figure 14: Relationship between security agencies and residents living along borders



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 15: Incidence of violent confrontation and clashes between residents and security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: In the past 12 months: (a) Were there any incidents of violent confrontation between residents and security agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, Military etc in this community? (b) Were there incidents of violent clashes between residents and security agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, Military etc in this community?

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had experienced some form of intimidation, harassment or what can be described as an illegal detention by any of the security agencies operating in their communities. As can be seen in Figure 16, an overwhelming majority indicated that in the last 12 months they had 'never' been: detained unlawfully by security agents (97%); harassed by security agents (91%) or intimidated by security agents in their communities (88%). On the other side, as much as one-tenth (10%) posited that they had experienced some form of intimidation by security agents while another 7 percent had been harassed either once or twice by security agencies over the period. The reasons given for these actions by security agencies ranged from the enforcement of the COVID-19 protocols that included preventing people from crossing in or out of the country, allegations of goods smuggling, aiding unauthorized crossing of border and confiscation of unregistered goods or motorbikes.


Figure 16: Experience of harassment, intimidation or unlawful detention



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: In the past 12 months, how often, if ever: (a) Did you experience any form of intimidation by security agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, Military etc in this community? (b) Did you experience any form of harassment by security agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, Military etc in this community? (c) Were you detained unlawfully for an alleged offense by security agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, Military etc from this community?

In ascertaining the involvement of residents in keeping their communities safe, respondents were asked whether they had watchdog associations located in their communities. Only a little over one-tenth (15%) indicated that their communities had recognized watchdog associations whilst more than half of respondents (60%) indicated there were no such groups. It is interesting to note that one-fourth (25%) don't know whether their community had a watchdog association or not.

Figure 17: Presence of watchdog associations in communities




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 3: TRUST BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND SECURITY AGENCIES

This section through a number of questions assesses the level of trust that exists between residents and security agencies in the 60 communities which were surveyed for this baseline.

In an attempt to get a sense of how useful the services provided by security agencies are to the communities they serve, residents were asked to rate security agencies in the provision of security services to residents. Eight in 10 (84%) of the respondents rated the services of security agencies to the communities as being 'very helpful or helpful' as opposed to less than one-tenth (7%) who thought that the services rendered were 'not very helpful or not helpful' (Figure 18).


Figure 18: Residents rating of the services of security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021) *Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how would you rate security agencies in their provision of security services to residents of this community?*

Respondents were asked how often they contacted particular security agencies and community leaders in the past 12 months to discuss security related issues. Responses displayed in Figure 19 show that to a large extent, ranging between 84 and 93 percent of respondents 'never' contacted any of the security agencies or community leaders for security related discussions. Majority of residents opined that Political party officials (93%) and Customs officers (90%) were the least contacted. On the other hand, although contact proved to be lower, assembly men or women were contacted more often (5%) than any other in that category. This was followed closely by religious leaders (4%) and traditional leaders (4%). Among the security agencies cohort, slightly more respondents contacted the police (6%) than an Immigration officer (4%) or a Customs officer (2%). Although respondents generally never contacted officials, the data at a glance indicates that when residents along border communities would want to discuss issues related to security, they are more comfortable with discussing these issues with community leaders such as assembly members, religious figures and traditional leaders rather than security agents.


Figure 19: Contact with officials



Source: Survey data (2021)

On which mechanisms were available for members to report crime or illegal activities at the borders, between 78 and 87 percent said the mechanisms listed were not available. Conversely, a little above 1 in 10 of respondents indicated 'yes' to the following as means of reporting crime in their communities: special information desks at offices of security agencies (16%); confidential meetings with security agents (14%) and use of dedicated hotlines provided by security agencies (14%) (Figure 20).

Figure 20: Mechanisms for reporting crime




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: Are the following mechanisms available to members of this community if they want to report or alert security agencies on criminal or illegal activities at the border(s)?

Security agencies rely on credible and actionable intelligence to make them effective in delivery of their mandate. In view of this, respondents were asked about the level of willingness of community members to provide information and collaborate with security agencies in addressing crime. Two categories of responses emerged, with the first category denoting *unwillingness* of community members to provide information or collaborate with security agencies and the second denoting *willingness* of community members to provide information and collaborate with security agencies. Unwillingness can be construed to mean those who responded in the negative, that is 'never' and 'rarely'. A look at Figure 21 reveals that about one-fifth of respondents think community members 'never' willingly provide information about crime or criminals to security agencies (20%) and/or willingly collaborate with security agencies to address crime (21%) respectively. In another breadth, just about 1 in 20 respondents thought that community members 'rarely' provided willful information to security agencies about criminals or crime (6%) and/or collaborated with security agencies to address crime (5%). In a follow up question, respondents who indicated that community members 'never' or 'rarely' provide information or collaborate with security agencies were asked to provide some possible reasons for their earlier response. Within this category, most of them opined that the fear of reprisal attacks (60%), perception that identity of informants is leaked (20%) and perception that security agents are not trustworthy (13%) and apathy (7%) were given as the main reasons why community members were unwilling to cooperate with security agencies to address crime (Figure 22).


On the other hand, responses such as 'sometimes', 'often' and 'always' were considered as an indication of willingness on the part of residents to provide information and collaborate with security agencies in addressing crime. Close to 4 in 10 (37%) residents interviewed in the survey indicated that community members 'sometimes' willingly provided information to security agencies about criminals and crime, which was 17 percentage points more than those who said 'often' (20%) and 23 percentage points more than those who indicated 'always'. Similarly, their perspectives on the willingness of community members to collaborate with security agencies followed the same trend. One-third (33%) were of the view that residents collaborated with security agencies 'sometimes', 'often' (21%) and 'always' (17%) in a descending order (Figure 21). Based on these responses a follow up question sought to ascertain the reasons for which community members would willingly provide information and or collaborate with security agencies to address crime. The desire for a safer community featured prominently (44%) as the primary reason for citizens to provide information or collaborate with security agencies. Among the other reasons were personal safety (30%), civic responsibility (13%) and respondents viewing these actions as a moral responsibility (9%) (Figure 23).

Figure 21: Willingness of residents to collaborate with security agencies to address crime




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *In your opinion and with your experiences living in this border community, do members of this community: (a) Willingly provide information to security agencies about criminals or crimes? (b) Willingly collaborate with security agencies to address crime?*

Figure 22: Reasons for residents' unwillingness to collaborate with security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 23: Reasons for residents' willingness to collaborate with security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)


Respondents were asked whether they had ever willingly provided information about criminals or criminal activities to any security agency, and it turned out that a large majority (83%) had done no such thing before as opposed to only less than one-fifth (17%) who had personally reported on such incidents (Figure 24). Among those who indicated they had ever willingly reported criminals or criminal activities, just about one-third (34%) revealed they held confidential meetings with security agents as a mechanism to deliver that information and a little over a quarter (26%) tipped off security agents on secured numbers that were provided to them. Others indicated they passed information to security at special information desks at the offices of security agencies (15%) and on dedicated hotlines (15%) provided by security agencies. The other less popular approaches used by residents to report crime were discretely dropping information (7%) and dropping confidential information on drop boxes at the offices of security agencies (4%) (Figure 25).

Figure 24: Provided information on criminals or criminal activity to security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 25: Mechanisms for willingly providing information on criminals or criminal activity



Source: Survey data (2021)

Cooperation is required from both residents and security agencies to contend with criminal activity. Respondents were asked to rate the level of cooperation between these two actors and responses in Figure 26 show that close to 4 in 10 (37%) of residents perceive 'high cooperation' between the security agencies and residents along border areas as opposed to 1 in 10 (13%) who think cooperation is 'nonexistent'. These two extreme divergent views expressed by residents in the study are differentiated by 24 percentage points.

Figure 26: Cooperation between residents and security agencies in fighting crime




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 4: ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SECURITY AGENCIES AND CITIZENS

This section is dedicated to exploring the nature of formal and purposive engagement between security agencies and border residents on issues of security.


Respondents were asked whether there was a formal engagement between security agencies and members of the community to discuss security issues within the community. Less than a quarter (23%) of respondents indicated that 'yes' there was such a formal engagement whiles three quarters (75%) held a contrary view (Figure 27). For respondents who noted there was a formal engagement, they were further asked to indicate the frequency of such formal engagement between the security agencies and community members. Out of those who indicated 'yes', two-thirds (66%) indicated that security agencies 'sometimes' engaged residents and less than one-fifth (18%) said 'often'. It is interesting to note that 12 percent of respondents opined that there was 'never' a formal engagement between security agencies and residents (Figure 28).

Figure 27: Formal engagement between security agencies and residents



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 28: Frequency of engagement between security agencies and residents



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *If yes, how often, if ever, do security agencies such as Immigration, Customs and Police engage members of this community at this forum to discuss security matters of mutual concern?*


Restricting the time frame of formal engagement to the past 12 months before the survey, respondents were asked if either they or anyone in their family had participated in a programme where security agencies engaged members of the community on security related matters in that period. Responses show that almost 8 in 10 (79%) had never participated in any such engagements, a sharp contrast to only 1 in 20 (5%) who said they had 'frequently' participated in programmes where the security agencies engaged citizens in the past 12 months (Figure 29). Closely related to this were a large majority (80%) of respondents who said they nor any of their family members had participated in a community sensitization meeting organized by the security agencies to discuss general security issues, including the rights and responsibilities of residents in the past 12 months. On the other hand, 15 percent of all respondents indicated 'yes' they had participated in such a meeting with security agencies (Figure 30).

Figure 29: Participation in engagement organized by security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *In the past 12 months, did you or anyone in your family participate in any programme where security agencies such as Immigration, Customs and the Police engaged members of this community on security matters of mutual concern?*

Figure 30: Participation in community sensitization organized by security agencies




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 5: TERRORISM AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS

This section of the report sought to gauge the awareness of residents living in border communities about terrorist threats to Ghana within the context of West Africa, and how they had been informed about terrorism and violent extremism.

In terms of what respondents perceived as activities of terrorism, 1 in 10 (10%) indicated they had no knowledge about it. Among those who had some knowledge about activities of terrorists, almost 3 in 10 (27%) respondents perceive terrorists to 'kill civilians and security agents' and another 1 in 5 (20%) think terrorists bomb public facilities. Fifteen percent (15%) perceive terrorists to be engaged in kidnapping citizens, security agents and foreigners and another 8 percent were of the opinion that they 'recruited and trained people to become suicide bombers' (Figure 31).


Figure 31: Perceived activities of terrorists



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, what activities do terrorists engage in?*

Respondents were further asked whether they perceived Ghana to be under external security threats from violent groups such as terrorists. Just about 4 in 10 (39%) of respondents who were residents were of the view that terrorists are a threat to Ghana. Contrary to this, a little more than half of all respondents (51%) held an opposing view by indicating 'No' while 1 in 10 (11%) were oblivious to any external threats from violent groups such as terrorists. In a similar vein, respondents were asked to indicate their awareness of recent terrorist activities in West Africa and almost 6 in 10 (59%) affirmed their awareness by indicating 'Yes' whereas those who indicated they were not aware belong to a strong minority of about one-third (35%) of all respondents (Figure 32). Those who indicated their awareness of terrorist activities in the West Africa sub-region were asked to point out specific countries that have come under terrorist attacks, and their responses are as follows: Nigeria (43%); Burkina (28%) and Cote d'Ivoire (24%). To a lesser extent 5 percent and 1 percent of respondents cited Togo and Benin respectively as having experienced attacks from violent extremists and terrorists (Figure 33).


Figure 32: Awareness of terrorism threats on Ghana and terrorist activities in West Africa



Source: Survey data (2021)


Ghana is a net contributor to peacekeeping operations around the world and on the African continent and has troops currently stationed in conflict and terrorism hotspots such as Mali as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and in Somalia as part of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This position of the country makes it a target for terrorist groups considering that Ghana shares borders with Burkina Faso which is fast developing a reputation as a hotbed for violent extremists and terrorism. Coupled with the current instability within West Africa, respondents were invariably asked: Is Ghana a potential target for terrorist attacks? Almost three-fourths (71%) of respondents who make up the majority indicated 'No' while their counterparts in the minority group (21%) thought otherwise by responding in the affirmative (Figure 35). Respondents who said 'yes' were asked further to indicate the source from which they had information about Ghana being a potential target for terrorist attacks. As shown in Figure 36, majority of the respondents said they had obtained this information from the radio (45%) and television (32%). Information obtained from public places such as markets, lorry stations etc. came in at a distant third with less than one-tenth (8%) of respondents indicating so. Interestingly, security agencies and the District Assemblies that are supposed to be spearheading campaigns about terrorism awareness were rather in the minority as indicated by 5 percent and 1 percent of all respondents respectively.

Figure 35: Is Ghana a potential target for terrorists?



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 33: Ghana's neighbouring countries under terrorist attacks



Source: Survey data (2021)


Given the context within which respondents found themselves, they were asked to gauge the level of awareness of community members about the threat of terrorism. In their opinion, respondents believed that less than one-fifth (16%) of community members had no awareness at all about violent extremism and terrorism. Conversely, slightly more than one-tenth (12%) of respondents opined that awareness was 'high' among community members, which was three times (39%) less than those who thought the awareness level among respondents was low (Figure 34).

Figure 34: Community awareness about threats of terrorism and violent extremism



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 36: Source of information about Ghana being a potential target for terrorist attacks



Source: Survey data (2021)

There was the need to explore the extent to which various organizations were working towards sensitizing border residents on terrorism and the security threats that it poses. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they or anyone in their family attended any community sensitization program on terrorism that was organized by either of the following organizations in the past 12 months – security agencies, chief or traditional authority, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), the District Assembly, Civil Society Organization (CSO) or the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). An overwhelming majority of respondents ranging between 86 and 98 percent said they did not attend any community sensitization event on terrorism which was organized by the previously stated organizations. However, in few instances, respondents noted that they or members of their families participated in community sensitization forums on terrorism organized by security agencies (12%), chief/traditional authority (12%), Faith Based organizations including churches and mosques (10%) and to a lesser extent the District Assembly (5%) (Figure 37).


Figure 37: Participation in community sensitization program on terrorism



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *In the past 12 months, did you or anyone in your family participate in a community programme organized by any of the following organizations to sensitize members of this community on terrorism and its threats?*

A question was posed that sought to get respondents perspectives about their level of satisfaction with government's efforts to prevent terrorist attacks in the country. The level of satisfaction (73%) expressed by respondents appeared to be higher compared to dissatisfaction (22%) as shown in Figure 38. A breakdown within the satisfaction cohort shows that 4 in 10 respondents (41%) were 'fairly satisfied' and one-third (32%) were 'very satisfied'. On other hand, less than one-fifth (15%) were 'not very satisfied' while less than 1 in 10 respondents (7%) were 'not at all satisfied' with government efforts at preventing terrorist attacks.


Figure 38: Satisfaction with government's efforts to prevent terrorist activities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Anti-terrorism campaigns in the US had the slogan “If you see something, say something”. Drawing on the aim of this slogan, a number of questions sought to measure the tendency for residents living along border communities to report to the police or other security agencies any action that relates to terrorism. The responses in Figure 39 revealed that almost 9 in 10 respondents (86%) were 'not at all likely' to report an incident that involves a person talking about breaking into a house. However, they indicated a strong willingness to report all other actions that have strong elements of terrorism, and these views ranged between 79 percent and 89 percent of all residents of border communities interviewed in this survey. An overwhelming majority (89%) said they are 'very likely' to report to the police or other security agencies when they see a person smuggle guns, a person stockpiling guns or if they hear a person talking about planting bombs or explosives respectively.

Figure 39: Likelihood of reporting actions related to terrorism in communities




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 6: SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR ONLY RESPONDENTS IN VOLTA REGION AND OTI REGION

This section of the report entails analysis that relates to questions exclusively targeting residents of border communities in the Volta and Oti regions of Ghana. These questions were necessitated by the attacks on public installations in parts of the Volta region in 2020 that were allegedly masterminded by the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF), a secessionist group that is seeking to break away parts of the Volta, Oti and Northern Regions to form an independent state. Response to the question of whether they had heard about the secessionist agenda to break away from Ghana to form another group showed that slightly less than two-thirds (62%) of the respondents had heard about it, whereas exactly one-third (33%) said they had not heard about it (Figure 41). When respondents were asked to assess the extent to which community members were aware of the secessionists' agenda to breakaway, just about half (51%) of the respondents indicated

'Yes' and slightly below half (23%) of this number said 'No', implying that community members were not aware. Yet still, exactly a quarter of respondents (25%) indicated they 'don't know' the level of awareness of community members about the agenda of the secessionists (Figure 41). In terms of responses on known collaborators of secessionist groups across the international borders of the country, less than one-fifth (17%) of respondents said 'yes'. Close to half (46%) of respondents do not think collaborators of the secessionist groups are across Ghana's international borders. However, slightly below 4 in 10 (37%) of respondents opined that they 'don't know' about the location of collaborators (Figure 40).

Figure 40: Awareness of secessionist groups



Source: Survey data (2021)

Reasons for secessionists break away agenda


Respondents who indicated they had personally heard and that community members were also aware of the secessionists agenda to break away from Ghana to form a new state were further asked what they thought could be the underlying reasons and they cited a number of justifications.

- Underdevelopment/Development: Respondents pointed out that the Volta region was underdeveloped and lacked a lot of amenities and strategic investments such as factories and industries that can propel the development of the area. Therefore, seceding from Ghana will provide the opportunity for the new state to chart its own development agenda.
- Marginalized region: Closely linked to the issue of underdevelopment is what respondents expressed as a feeling of marginalization. Respondents accused the ruling government of suppressing and marginalizing the people of the region. Hence, providing a basis for the secessionist agenda.
- Desire for freedom and independence: As expressed in the previous issues, there is a link to what respondents deem a desire for some segments to secede in order to enjoy freedom and independence. This will enable the proposed new state to have

- the freedom to manage their own affairs and thus pursue the much-needed development the area 'deserves.'
- The matters arising from the plebiscite of 1956: Some respondents hold the view that the outcome of the plebiscite had a period of operation which had expired, and thus, there was the need for the affected areas to rally and seek a restoration of the Western Togoland.

With regards to respondents' view on whether they support or are opposed to idea of secessionists groups to break away from Ghana to form an independent country, opposition constituted more than half of respondents. Almost 5 in 10 (48%) indicated they were 'completely opposed' and another small in-group (4%) were 'somewhat opposed'. Less than one-fourth of respondents were in support of the agenda of secessionist groups, with 14 percent saying they were 'completely supportive' and 8 percent saying 'somewhat supportive'. Those who found themselves in the middle of the two extreme divergent views were 9 percent while those without an opinion on this constituted a second force with 17 percent (Figure 41).

Figure 41: Support or opposition to secessionist agenda



Source: Survey data (2021)

In concluding interviews with respondents, interviewers posed the question “Who do you think sent us to do this interview?”, and this elicited some interesting responses. One in 4 (39%) respondents were of the view that interviewers were sent by the government to conduct the interviews. This outstripped by 6 percentage points the number of respondents who were convinced that it was CDD-Ghana (33%) that actually conducted the survey although interviewers wore identification tags, had introductory letters and introduced themselves as researchers from CDD-Ghana before administering the questionnaires to respondents who agreed to participate in the survey. Yet, just about one-tenth (9%) of respondents said they 'didn't know' while a minute segment said it was God (1%) and or political parties/politician (1%) that sent the researchers to conduct the interviews with them (Table 3).

Table 3: Who sent the interviewers to conduct the survey?

	Percent
Government (including any government official, government agency	39%
CDD-Ghana [i.e. the correct response]	33%
Don't know	9%
Non-government or religious organization	3%
Media	3%
No one	3%
Research Company / Organization / Programme [but not CDD-Ghana]	2%
University / School / College	2%
Other	1%
International organization or another country	1%
Private company	1%
Political party or politician	1%
God	1%

Source: Survey data (2021)

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS OF DATA ON SECURITY SERVICES


INTRODUCTION

This section of the report is dedicated to the analysis of data collected from some segments of security agents operating within the 60 border communities that were sampled for this survey. In all, 80 security agents from various security agencies such as the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Customs Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS), Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and Narcotic Control Commission (NACOC) were interviewed as respondents. Similar to the preceding section on residents of border communities, the discussions are structured under the following themes: general information about the respondents and communities; Security challenges and resident-security agencies' relationship; trust between residents and security agencies; Engagement between security agencies and citizens; Terrorism Awareness and Preparedness.

SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENTS AND COMMUNITIES

Demography of Respondents (Security agents)

Figure E: Age cohort




Source: Survey data (2021)

A majority of the respondents, who formed almost half (47%) of respondents drawn from the security agencies falls within the active work force age of 26-35 years. This is followed by a little over a quarter (26%) who fall within the age cohort of 36-45 years. While those within the age cohort of 46-55 years and 56-65 years were almost at par with each constituting one-tenth of respondents, the younger age cohort of 18-25 years incidentally represented 5 percent of all respondents (Figure E).


As illustrated in Figure F, out of the total of 88 respondents interviewed, 8 in 10 (80%) were males while their female counterparts were in the minority group (20%) of participants who responded to the survey questionnaire. It could be deduced from the data that there were more male respondents available for the interviews as compared to females at the period of the data collection. The disparity could be that there were more male recruits stationed at these border posts than females and possibly at a general level within all the security agencies.

Figure F: Gender of respondents (Security agents)



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure G: Please can you tell me your highest level of education



Source: Survey data (2021)


On respondents' educational background, a majority of the security agents interviewed (37%) had completed University with, at least first degree while about a quarter (24%) had completed or were in senior high school. This was followed by about one-fifth (18%) who had completed or were in some polytechnic education and less than one-tenth (7%) having post, graduate completed respectively. Only 1 percent had no formal education. From the data, it could be concluded that the respondents cut across all levels of education, including non-formal education, as shown in Figure G.

Also, the chart below depicts the various security agencies engaged during the period. Within the broader context of national security, several border management institutions- Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); CEPS/Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Police Service; Narcotics Control Commission and Ghana Armed Forces were engaged during the survey.

Close to 6 in 10 (56%) of respondents were from GIS while the second largest group (35%) of operatives worked with CEPs. While less than one-tenth (7%) were personnel of Ghana Police Service, 1% each, represented Narcotics Control Commission and Ghana Armed Forces.

Some of the agencies engaged in the survey such as GIS, CEPS, Ghana Police Service and Ghana Armed Forces are directly authorized to use force, which implies the power to arrest, detain and prosecute offenders. The GIS, CEPS and to an extent the police were more visible at the entry points of the country. In addition, agents from these three agencies showed more interest in the survey and therefore participated after informed consent was sought from them.

Figure H: Security agents and their agencies




Source: Survey data (2021)

Location of Security agents

As illustrated in Figure 42, Volta Region has the highest number of districts/border communities, and this is reflected in highest number of security agents (30%), setting it apart from Bono Region (22%) by 8 percentage points. Oti Region on the other hand had the least number of security agents (3%), while the rest of the security agents were each spread over the other 7 regions by between 5 and 9 percentage shares of all the respondents in this category.


Figure 42: Regional Distribution of security agents



Source: Survey data (2021)

Conversely, the surveyed districts were sixteen (16), with several border communities under each-individual district. Out of the 16 districts surveyed, most of them were within the category of a district with less than 5% being municipal or metropolitan in character. Jaman North Municipal in the Bono Region was represented by the highest number of security agents (17%), and it was followed closely by Ketu North (13%) and Ketu South (10%). The districts with the least representation were Ho Municipal (2%) and Kassena Nankana (2%) (Figure 43).


Figure 43: Distribution of security agents by Metropolitan/Municipal/District



Source: Survey data (2021)

Ghana like any other country has two main categories of border posts (approved and unapproved border posts). The survey was conducted in both approved and unapproved borders across sampled Borders. As illustrated in Figure 44, two-thirds (67%) of sampled security agents were located around approved border posts, while one-third (33%) were stationed at unapproved border posts. The implication is that, most of the security officials are posted and stationed largely at the approved borders but carry out intermittent patrols at the unapproved borders. Another reason may be that, there are not enough staff to create posts at unapproved border sites, which may be due to the ever-increasing number of unapproved border crossing sites.

Figure 44: Category of border post




Source: Survey data (2021)

Mobile networks in border communities

Generally, on assessing the availability of telecommunications networks, it was clear that, MTN is the most common (36%) network available in most of Ghana's border communities. This was followed closely by Vodafone, represented by one-third (32%). Mobile networks from neighbouring countries constituted about 13% (Figure 45). In some cases, the signals from the foreign mobile networks interfere with the Ghanaian networks and crowd out local signals.

Figure 45: Mobile networks available in border communities




Source: Survey data (2021)

Again, on the quality of available networks, 18% of respondents cited MTN has a 'very good' quality reception, a significant number, representing 28% responded 'good'; and 11% of the respondents expressed 'very poor'. On network quality, 17% of the respondents felt they are 'very good', 28% indicated 'good' and 17% said, 'very poor' for other networks. Vodafone was reported to have somewhat lower quality network availability; with only 7% of respondents expressing 'very good' for it, 23% 'good' and 14% of the cohort population responded 'very poor'. While 5% of respondents indicated Airtel-Tigo had 'very good' quality, 21% responded 'good' and 7% indicated 'very poor'. It was however axiomatic that, almost all the available networks had fair reception in all the border communities, with glo, 50% responded 'fair' and 'do not know', Vodafone 32%, followed by Airtel-Tigo 31%; MTN 23% and other networks with the least of 3% respondents indicated 'fair'.

Again, in terms of the quality of reception of the networks, MTN was described by less than one-fifth (18%) of the security agents as 'very good' and it was closely rivaled by foreign networks (14%) that clearly superseded Vodafone and Airtel-Tigo. With the exception of Glo, and across all the networks, reception was described as 'very good' by less than 30 percent of all respondents. However, MTN and foreign networks stood at par with commanding a share of 28 percent of respondents. Networks from neighbouring countries topped (17%) on the list of networks by 'very poor' network reception with Vodafone being 3 percentage points below (11%) (Figure 46).


Figure 46: Quality of mobile phone reception in communities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Beyond the quality of reception, with the exception of Glo where all respondents (100%) cited 'very poor' internet connectivity, almost all the available telecommunication networks whose signals are received in the border communities have some levels of internet or data connectivity. For instance, half (50%) of respondents interviewed indicated, MTN has 'very good' internet connectivity though 34% also responded 'very poor' and 13% indicated 'fair' for the same network. Out of the total respondents, 40% responded 'very good' quality internet for other networks, however, 32% indicated 'very poor', and 8% and 20% thought the internet connectivity was 'fair' and 'do not know'. Also, while a little above a quarter (27%) of respondents indicated Vodafone has 'very good' internet connectivity, 26% responded 'very good' for Airtel-Tigo. However, 51% and 46% of respondents thought, internet connectivity for the two networks is 'very poor'; and 21% and 20% responded 'fair' accordingly.


Figure 47: Quality of internet or data connectivity



Source: Survey data (2021)


When asked about radio stations located in the border communities surveyed, a large majority (71%) answered 'No', meaning there are no radios in the communities; while a little over one-fourth (28%) answered 'Yes' (Figure 48). With regards to receiving radio signals from outside the community (in other communities), majority of respondents (65%) indicated 'Yes', they received radio signals and a quarter (25%) mentioned 'No'. However, one-tenth (10%) indicated they did not know (Figure 49).

Figure 48: Radio station(s) located in this community




Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 49: Signals from radio stations located outside this community



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 50: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working in this community?



Source: Survey data (2021)


Concerning the availability of Civil Society Organizations and their area of operation in the border communities, almost two-thirds (64.9%) interviewed indicated there were 'No' such organizations; as opposed to 1 in 10 (11%) respondents who answered 'yes'. A third category of respondents constituting one quarter (24%) however, indicated they 'did not know' (Figure 50). According to 3 in 10 of respondents (29%), CSOs in the communities operate in the health service sector, and about 2 in 10 (21%) respondents mentioned Girl Child and Women Empowerment; and the same number of respondents (21%) cited Education as the area of focus for the CSOs. The remaining sectors: food, agriculture and fisheries, humanitarian services and governance each had a proportion of 7 percent respectively.

Figure 51: Areas of engagement of CSOs:



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 52: Category of people who usually cross the border into Ghana daily



Source: Survey data (2021)

Immigration officials regulating human mobility at the borders were asked of the People/Nationals who cross the border most often and this is presented in Figure 52. Out of the 75 respondents the majority (47%) mentioned ECOWAS Nationals, while exactly 4 in 10 (40%) respondents cited local residents. However, response on other nationals who use the border posts were 13 percent. At the time of conducting this baseline, the borders had been closed for almost 10 months due to COVID-19 restrictions, which meant that persons were not allowed to enter or exit the borders. The question thus sought to retrospectively gauge the caliber of persons that crossed the borders before the borders were closed in late March 2020. This might also be due to the open border policy as a result of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement within the subregion (Sosuh, 2011; Lamprey, 2013), which is seen as a fundamental priority that drives sub-regional integration, by aiding cross-border movement. Agyei & Clotey (2007) noted that because of the implementation of the Protocol, population movements within the sub-region have constituted a relatively large proportion of all immigrants in most of the member states.


Figure 53: Main purpose for people who cross the border into Ghana



Source: Survey data (2021)

Borders throughout the sub-region witness the crossing of traders and professionals on a daily basis for short term transactions, both formal and informal. These intra-regional movements have included traders, farm labourers and unskilled workers (Awumbilla, 2018). In a ranked order, Immigration officials as respondents were asked what they perceive to be the purposes for border crossing by major nationals. The outcome presented in Figure 53 indicates that, the most significant purposes are trading (37%), farming (23%), Business (14%); visits to families (13%) and 6% indicated they do not know followed by 1% who thought people cross the borders for the other reasons such as getting provisions and household items accordingly.

Figure 54: Status of these unapproved routes




Source: Survey data (2021)

According to the personnel interviewed at the time of the survey, almost half (49%) felt that, the unapproved borders are usually busy, that is, residents/people used them all seasons, whether during the dry season or rainy season it was accessible. Below half (41%) of the respondents also pointed out that the use of some unapproved borders was subject to the changing seasons throughout the year, which implied that accessibility is hampered by seasonal weather conditions (Figure 54). For instance, during the rainy season some unapproved routes are cut off and thus not used by residents or other users for border crossings.

According to section 2(1) (6) of Act 573 (2000) of the Ghana Immigration Service, entry into the country shall be through an approved place of entry and any contravention of this constitutes an offence. Considering this, security agencies in border communities ought to conduct routine/regular patrols at these unapproved border sites as required by the law. Accordingly, when asked about their patrols along these unapproved borders, an overwhelming majority (64%) cited they 'always' conducted patrols along the unapproved routes along the borders; while a little over 1 in 10 of respondents (13%) indicated they 'sometimes' conducted patrols and 11% felt they did that 'often'. Just about one-tenth (10%) expressed the thought that, their operation at the unapproved borders was

'rarely' conducted, meaning, they did patrols in those areas when necessary. And only 1% indicated that the security service never conducted any operation (Figure 55).

Figure 55: Frequency of conducting patrols around unapproved routes along the border




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *How often, if ever, do security agencies operating in this area conduct patrols around unapproved routes along the border?*

Concerning security personnel conducting patrols to and from border posts and crossings in their area of responsibility, close to half (48%) of respondents interviewed stated they conducted patrols 'always' while 3 in 10 (30%) indicated 'very often'. Also, about 11% said they conduct patrols to these border posts sometimes and 10% said rarely. However, only 1% said they never did.


Further exploratory questions involving patrols along the various crossing points inquired about the feasibility of moving from one crossing point to another to monitor the movement of goods and people. In response, almost 4 in 10 (39%) responded it is 'sometimes feasible', which was slightly more than about one-third (31%) who said it is 'very feasible' and 23% of the respondents indicated 'somewhat feasible'. Only less than one-tenth (8%) differed with their opinion by noting that it was 'not feasible' to conduct patrols to all these border posts (Figure 57).

Figure 56: Frequency of conducting patrols to/from all border posts



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *Considering the locations of the crossing points in your area of responsibility, how often are security personnel able to conduct patrols to/from all these border posts?*

Figure 57: How feasible is it for security personnel to move from one border area to another




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *Considering the locations of the crossing points in your area of responsibility, how feasible is it for security personnel to move from one border area to another to monitor the movements of people and goods?*

It is common to find that except for border posts located in the district capitals, almost all the border communities visited had no police stations or police posts. As illustrated in Figure 58, about 6 in 10 (63%) respondents mentioned there are no police stations or police posts in the communities. However, less than one-third (27%) indicated they had police stations in the border community, and a further one-tenth (10%) indicated police posts were located in the communities in which they were stationed. By inference police visibility in the border communities is lower compared to the regular border security agencies, that is GIS and CEPS. The strongest implication is that, the other security


agencies usually serve as law enforcement and are capable of protecting lives and properties in communities that do not have police stations or police posts.

Figure 58: Is police station or post located in this community



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 59: Common type of crime committed in border communities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Cross-border dynamics represent a fundamental dimension of trade flows, subverting the laws of nation-states in the case of illegal trafficking and terrorism, which exploit the highly porous borders for trading arms, drugs and migrants or carrying out attacks in neighboring countries (Walther, 2017). It is with this in mind that respondents' views were ascertained on the prevalence of border crimes. Figure 60 reveals that, out of the 88 respondents sampled, a large proportion (53%) cited smuggling of goods (e.g. fuel, cocoa) as the major criminal activity at the border. The other types of crime which were each cited by less than one-fifth of the respondents included; stealing/petty theft (14%),

illicit crossing of migrants (13%), and armed robbery (11%). However, close to one-tenth (9%) did not give an opinion and hence said they 'Do not Know'. These clear threats to security at the borders of Ghana are not different from that which pertains to her neighbouring countries because the crimes cut across national barriers. Smuggling of goods seems to be the most common crime committed in the border communities surveyed.


The items that are smuggled vary from one border area to another. For instance, while the smuggling of fuel and bicycles etc. are common at most border posts in the northern part of Ghana, smuggling of cocoa and rice is very common at the Western, Western North and Bono borders. Areas like Dadieso, Gono Krom, Kofi Badu, and Kwame Sie Krom (Sosuh, 2011) are noted to be the smuggling depots (Ghana News Agency (GNA), April 2010). In some instances, the smuggling syndicates involve some corrupt security personnel and officials of licensed producer buying companies (Daily Graphic, July 2010).

SECTION 2: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND RESIDENT-SECURITY AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

This section of the report assesses the nature of security challenges in the border communities and the existing relationship between security agencies and residents from the perspective of security agents working in border communities.


Generally, the illustration in Figure 60 points directly to different forms of disputes among residents in border communities. A clear majority (56%) said, none of the listed disputes existed in the border communities. Chieftaincy and communal land disputes are common forms of disputes in most Ghanaian communities just like the border communities, this was indicated by 2 in 10 (20%) and 1 in 10 (11%) respondents respectively. Just about one-tenth (7%) indicated other forms of disputes in their communities and highlighted occasional cases such as: farmer-herder disputes; and confrontation between the residents and security agencies over the use of the border as the presence of security agencies threaten their livelihoods that are illicit by law. The other forms of disputes such as religious disputes and disputes over water resources were respectively not common in the communities surveyed. Yet still another 4 percent were oblivious and indicated they 'do not know' about any disputes.

Figure 60: Disputes raging in this community



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 61: Relationship between residents and the various security agencies




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: How would you describe: The relationship between the following security agencies such as Immigration, Customs, Police, military etc and residents?

Generally, there seem to be cordial relationships among the various security agencies that are in charge of protecting the country's borders. When their opinions were sought about the relationship between the various security agencies and residents, about 7 in 10 (70%) said the relationship between immigration personnel and residents was cordial; and 6 in 10 (64%) indicated cordial relationships between Customs Officers and residents. Similarly, less than half (40%) of respondents opined that the relationship between residents and the Military and Police respectively could be described as cordial. Although respondents noted that cooperative relationships between security agencies and residents were less prevalent, Immigration was seen to have fairly higher (14%) cooperation with residents than the others; and one-tenth (10%) noted the same for Customs. Immigration Officers were stationed at every border crossing point in which surveys were carried out, but this was not always the case for the other agencies. This is primarily because Immigration is responsible for movement of people along the borders whereas Customs focuses on the movement of goods. This explains why as much as half of respondents 'do not know' the relationship between the Ghana Armed Forces (50%) and the Police (49%) respectively, because they are not stationed in the communities although they may conduct patrols from time-to-time. However, there still exists some minute level of mistrust and confrontational relationships between the security agencies and residents. Across all the security agencies, between 1 and 6 percent perceived these levels of mistrust and confrontation (Figure 61).

In terms of the mechanisms available for residents to report illegal activities along the borders, security agents interviewed during the survey pointed out that most residents (64%) 'discreetly dropped information to security agents' and close to half (47%) said residents 'had confidential meetings with security agencies'. On the flip side, a striking majority of respondents agreed that there were no 'dedicated hotlines provided by security agencies' (88%) and no 'security numbers provided by security agencies' (84%) for which residents can report illegal activities (Figure 62). This finding reveals that security agencies operating at the borders are missing a lot of information from majority of residents that can help them to be more effective in improving security provision at the borders. However, it appears that they are more reliant on the informants that they have cultivated for intelligence information.


Figure 62: Mechanisms available to resident for reporting on illegal activities at the border



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: Which of the following mechanisms are available for members of this community if they are to report or alert security agencies on illegal activities at the border(s)?

Security agents were asked to rate the frequency with which residents alerted them about illegal entry and smuggling activities along the borders. Findings reveal that although residents 'sometimes' reported smuggling activities (51%) and illegal entry by foreigners (52%) to security agencies, they were not so keen about reporting either smuggling activities or illegal entry at the borders 'very often/always'. This is reflected in a small proportion of respondents saying that residents 'very often/always' reported smuggling activities (7%) and illegal entry (13%) respectively. However, more respondents noted that residents never reported smuggling (22%) and illegal entry (9%). Further buttressing this point, 2 in 10 respondents noted that residents 'rarely' alerted security agencies about smuggling activities (20%) and about illegal entry (21%) respectively (Figure 63).


Figure 63: Frequency of residents providing information or alerting security agencies of Illegal entry by foreigners and smuggling



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: How frequently do residents provide information or alert security agencies of: (a) Illegal entry by foreigners in the community? (b) Smuggling activities in the community?

Two questions assessed respondents' perspectives on whether there had been any violent confrontation and or violent clashes between security agencies and residents in the border communities in the past 12 months prior to the survey. The majority of respondents noted that there has never been any incident of violent clashes (72%) and/or violent confrontation (66%) between security agencies and residents over the 12 month period. Yet still just about 1 in 10 respondents indicated that incidents of violent clashes (9%) and/or incidents of violent confrontation (10%) 'rarely' occurred in the last 12 months. On the contrary, dissenting opinions were in the minority as indicated by 1 in 10 (14%) respondents who said that 'sometimes' there were incidents of violent clashes and precisely 2 in 10 (20%) respondents opined that there were incidents of violent confrontation between residents and security agents (Figure 64).

Figure 64: In the past 12 months: Were there incidents of violent clashes and or violent confrontation between residents and security agents



Source: Survey data (2021)

Respondents gave a number of reasons why there were violent altercations between residents and security agencies.

- *Arresting and preventing illegal activities*

According to the security agents who responded to the interviews, one major reason that brings up altercations between residents is when they arrest residents for unlawful actions such as smuggling of fuel, cocoa, clothing etc. and seize smuggled goods. In some instances, residents amass at their offices or border posts to demand the release of the person(s) in detention or to retrieve the items which had been confiscated. At Menuku in the Oti region there was an instance where residents in the immediate Togolese town across the border invaded the border post to secure the release of a suspect who had been arrested.

- *Residents misunderstand the role and processes of security agencies*

Another cause of altercation stems from residents not having an understanding about the mandate of security agencies, particularly the Ghana Immigration Services and the procedures that persons have to go through in order to cross the border. Residents thus refuse the orders of security agents and this brings about violent confrontations.

- *Restriction of movements across borders due to presidential directive on border closure*


Enforcement of the President of Ghana's directive for all borders to be closed as part of measures to curb the influx of COVID-19 created a situation in which residents whose livelihoods center around economic activities of an open border were being curtailed. Residents vent their anger and frustration on security agents who were enforcing this directive by the president and this created an uneasy situation which in some instances degenerated into violent altercations. The voter registration process in 2020 also came along with a lot of cases where people were refused entry into the country as they sought to be registered as voters.

- *Residents have personal issues with security agents*

When some residents have personal issues with specific officers, this can escalate to bring on board other community members to violently confront the security agent in question. This will create a standoff between the residents and security agents. Respondents cited instances where such altercations stemmed from security agents' amorous relationships with the women in the community.

As depicted in Figure 65, about 8 in 10 (78%) respondents indicated that there was 'no' community watch dog association or volunteers that supplemented the efforts of security agencies to maintain law and order in the border communities as against 2 in 10 (22%) who said 'yes' such groups existed in the communities. A strong implication is that security agencies are not making conscious attempts to recruit residents as partners in the provision of security within their communities. Again, residents may not necessarily be interested in issues that relate to security and maintaining law and order and this may possibly be ascribed to a lower level of understanding about their active role as citizens in giving meaning to the mantra “security is a shared responsibility”.

Figure 65: Presence of watchdog association in communities




Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 3: TRUST BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND SECURITY AGENCIES

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which residents were willing to provide information and or collaborate with security agencies to address crime. Responses such as 'sometimes', 'very often' and 'always' were classified as *willingness* to provide information or collaborate with security agencies while *unwillingness* was derived from these responses – 'never' and 'rarely'. In terms of unwillingness, less than one-fifth in each case 'never' or 'rarely' provided information on criminals or willingly collaborate with security agencies to address crime. A further breakdown as indicated by security agents show that: 13 percent said residents 'never' and 16 percent believed residents 'rarely' willingly provide information to security agencies about criminals or crime. The results were not so different when assessed against the willingness of respondents to collaborate with

security agencies to address crime. In their opinion, 15 percent think residents 'never' and 18 percent believe they 'rarely' willingly collaborate (Figure 66).

Figure 66: Willingness of residents to collaborate with security agencies to address crime




Source: Survey data (2021)

Engagements with security agencies on the issue of unwillingness deduced that, there were mixed feelings about citizens unwillingness to provide information or collaborate with security agencies in most border communities. About one-third (32%) of sampled security officials indicated 'never' or 'rarely' and these respondents were most frequently attributed this to the fact that residents fear reprisal attacks from suspected criminals. A little above one-tenth (14%) of respondents also indicated other reasons for which residents were unwilling to provide information. This includes channeling issues through their community leaders such as chiefs and assembly members or the perception that officers are fighting against their livelihood opportunities because some residents and their relatives participate in illegal activities such as smuggling, hence, they were not interested in helping security agencies to address criminal issues. Similarly, 14% cited fear of being stigmatized as the reason for not providing information or collaborating with security agencies. Additionally, about 1 in 10 (12%) of the respondents said, citizens' unwillingness was due to fear that the identity of informants may be leaked. Some 11% of respondents perceive that security agents were not trustworthy. On the lower end of the spectrum, about 9% thought respondents were simply apathetic while 7% indicated they do not know (Figure 67).

On the contrary, more than half (55%) of the respondents indicated, residents 'sometimes' were willing to provide information to security agencies to address crimes while a little less than half (47%) were willing to collaborate with security agencies to address crime. About 1 in 20 respondents perceived extreme instances where residents 'always' willing

provided information on criminals (6%) and willingly collaborated with security agencies to address crime (5%) (Figure 66).


Figure 67: Reasons for residents' unwillingness to provide information or collaborate with security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)

In exploring the reasons for residents' willingness to provide information or collaborate with security agencies, about 3 in 10 (30%) respondents thought this was due to residents' desire for a safer community and a little over one-fourth (27%) mentioned personal safety as the driving force. Again, a little over one-tenth (14%) of respondents indicated civic responsibility, financial rewards (10%) and retaliation against offenders (9%) as the other outstanding reasons for which residents willingly provided information and or collaborated with security agencies (Figure 68).


Figure 68: Reasons for residents' willingness to provide information or collaborate with security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)


Effective inter-agency cooperation and coordination in managing security for national security interests is paramount given that the various agencies have different mandates, command structures and source of authorization. This question became even more relevant given that there have been more deployments of various security outfits to the border communities in the last two years. With regards to the perceived level of cooperation among the security agencies, most respondents (43%) rated it as moderate cooperation ahead of just about one-third (31%) who rated it as a high level of cooperation. However, 2 in 10 (22%) respondents said there was low cooperation among the security agencies such as Immigration, Customs, Armed Forces and Police in securing Ghana's borders (Figure 69). As opposed to the minority which seems to think that the various security agencies were not very well coordinated (6%) or not well coordinated (16%), majority of respondents think that the security agencies were somewhat coordinated (34%) and very well coordinated (33%) (Figure 70).

Figure 69: Level of cooperation between security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 70: Level of coordination between security agencies



Source: Survey data (2021)


SECTION 4: ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SECURITY AGENCIES AND CITIZENS

This section sets out to assess the level, nature and frequency of formal engagements between security agencies and residents in border communities.

Since management of Ghana's borders is a collective effort (that involves many stakeholders), opinions were sought from the sampled respondents about the availability of any formal platform among security and residents to discuss security matters of mutual concern. Out of the total, 1 in 6 (59%) interviewed agreed they sometimes discuss security matters at formal platforms while about 4 in 10 (39%) indicated no such formal engagements (Figure 71). In a follow up with respondents who said 'yes' to ascertain the frequency of such formal engagements, almost 6 in 10 (59%) indicated 'sometimes' and one-third (35%) noted it was 'often'. Extreme minorities said such engagements were always (3%) while those who said never were 3 percent (Figure 72).


Directly linked with the above is creating security consciousness among citizens. Hence, Figure 73 illustrates attempts made by security agencies to sensitize residents living in border communities about general security issues including their rights and responsibilities in the last 12 months before the survey. The respondents were almost split between an actual engagement and no such engagement. Almost half (49%) of the respondents said 'yes' to such an engagement while close to half (46%) indicated 'no' (Figure 73). This implies that, there is almost an even effort by security agencies on community sensitization on general security issues at the border posts. Building on this effort can lead to increased security consciousness and can be helpful in detection of suspicious characters such as terrorists' activities among citizens.

Figure 71: Formal engagement between security services and residents




Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 72: Platform to discuss security matters of mutual concern



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 73: In the past 12 months, did security agencies sensitize residents on general security issues including their rights and responsibilities



Source: Survey data (2021)

SECTION 5: TERRORISM AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS


This section focused on questions that sought to assess security agents about their understanding and awareness about terrorism; whether they had participated in any anti-terrorism initiatives and whether their fellow team mates had also benefitted from any such training; as well as the level of confidence they had in Ghana's security architecture to repel attacks from violent extremists and terrorists.

To fight terrorism and other extremist groups, it is all imperative to know; the causes of terrorism, the various terrorist groups and their objectives, methods of recruitment and tactics of terrorists and the grievances that may induce terrorism in communities. As illustrated in the Figures 74 – 77, respondents' opinion on these issues were sought. Respondents were asked to self-reflect on whether they know about the causes of terrorism by indicating the level of agreement or disagreement. It turned out that a lot more of the respondents 'agree' (41%) and 'strongly agree' (25%) that they know the causes of terrorism than those who said they 'disagree' (17%) and 'strongly disagree' (7%). Exactly 1 in 10 (10%) 'neither agree or disagree' that they know the causes of terrorism (Figure 74). Concerning various terrorist groups and their objectives, one-third (35%) of respondents 'agree' and about one-fourth (23%) 'strongly agree' they know about it. On the other hand, one-fourth (25%) 'disagree' and another close to one-tenth (11%) of the

respondents 'strongly agree' to knowing the various terrorist groups and their objectives. In the middle is 1 in 20 (5%) of respondents who say they 'neither agree or disagree' on the issue (Figure 75).


Scaling the discussions further on respondents' knowledge about the methods of recruitment and tactics, slightly more than half (52%) of respondents agree/strongly agree. A breakdown shows that 3 in 10 (32%) 'agree' and 2 in 10 (20%) 'strongly agree'. However, a quarter (25%) 'disagree' and 1 in 10 (13%) 'strongly disagree' that they know about the methods of recruitment and tactics of terrorist. Collectively, just about 4 in 10 (38%) either 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree' that they have knowledge about the issue at stake while less than 1 in 10 (7%) neither agreed or disagreed (Figure 76). Lastly, the spotlight was put on the grievances that usually induced terrorism in communities. Close to 6 in 10 (59%) 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that they know the grievances that induce terrorism, with a disaggregation showing that almost 4 in 10 (38%) of respondents 'agree' and 2 in 10 (21%) also 'strongly agree'. However, put together one-third (33%) disagree or strongly disagree about knowing about the grievances inducing terrorism. If disaggregated, about 17% 'disagree' and 16% of the same sampled respondents 'strongly disagree' that they know about the grievances that induced terrorism in communities. The illustrations significantly show that the various reasons that usually motivate people to join terrorist groups and security agents' knowledge on these varied. Because, within the same cohort population sampled, 6% 'neither agree or disagree' (Figure 77).

Figure 74: Agree or disagree: I know the causes of terrorism




Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 75: Agree or disagree: I know various terrorist groups and their objectives




Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 76: Agree or disagree: I know the methods of recruitment and tactics of terrorists




Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 77: Agree or disagree: I know about the grievances that may induce terrorism in communities



Source: Survey data (2021)


Figure 78: Training or drills in terrorism awareness and preparedness



Source: Survey data (2021)

Figure 78 depicts that almost 6 in 10 (59%) of the respondents stated 'no' when asked about undertaking any training or drills in counter-terrorism in the last 12 months as opposed to 4 in 10 (41%) respondents who indicated 'yes'. However, it appears, other security agents who were not engaged in this survey participated in some trainings on the above question than people who were directly interviewed. As seen in Figure 79, when asked about whether other members of their team had undertaken training or drills in terrorism preparedness and awareness, a significantly higher majority (77%) of respondents said 'yes' while those who said 'no' were clearly in the minority group with exactly 2 in 10 (20%).

Figure 79: In the past 12 months: Did any member of your team undertake any training or drills in terrorism awareness and preparedness




Source: Survey data (2021)

On the level of preparedness to detect and deal with threats of terrorism and terrorist activities, less than half (30%) of respondents thought that the security agencies are very well prepared, and less than one-tenth (8%) were confident enough to state the security agencies were well prepared.

Those who stood in the middle ground and were of the opinion that the security agencies were 'somewhat well' prepared were less than one-third (28%) of respondents. Those who expressed contrary opinions were exactly one-third (33%) and are represented by those who indicated 'not so well' (24%) and 'not well at all' (9%) when disaggregated (Figure 80). Respondents in this category noted these reasons for their vote of no confidence in security agencies being able to detect and deal with threats of terrorism. A number of respondents cited the lack of logistics such as guns, ammunition, bullet proof vests for all officers, particularly among Immigration and Custom officers will make it difficult to face terrorists head-on even though quite a number of them had been trained in counter-terrorism. Again, they mentioned inadequate personnel to man the borders and inadequate vehicles, All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) and motorbikes to conduct frequent patrols along the border areas as a deficit. Yet still, since there are no metal detectors at the border posts coupled with numerous crossing points at the borders, it will be difficult to detect weapons that are dismantled and sent across the border in different parts over different periods. The location of the border posts makes it difficult to manage the borders. For instance, the Kpoglo Border Post is situated in the community and is surrounded by houses of residents who can easily harbor criminals and to some extent terrorists. Thus, security officers can be surprised by terrorists and violent extremists.


Figure 80: In your opinion, how well prepared are the security agencies at the borders to detect and deal with threats of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist activities



Source: Survey data (2021)

Respondents were asked to describe the level of awareness of residents with regards to the threats of terrorists' attacks in Ghana and 4 in 10 (41%) indicated that it was 'low' and close to 2 in 10 (17%) said there was 'none at all'. Those who expressed some form of optimism about some awareness among residents were within the lower bracket as one-third (33%) indicated moderate awareness and a significantly lower proportion said it was 'high' (Figure 81). It appears that with the exception of security agents in the border communities, ordinary citizens knowledge on threat of violent extremists' and terrorist groups is low.


Figure 81: How would you describe the level of awareness of members of this community regarding the threat of violent extremists and terrorists' groups attack in Ghana?



Source: Survey data (2021)

Regarding security agencies making conscious efforts to sensitize residents of border communities on issues of terrorism preparedness and awareness, almost 7 in 10 (69%) said 'no' such efforts had been made in the past 12 months compared to only a quarter (26%) who said otherwise (Yes). One in 20 (5%) had no clue of any such sensitization efforts and three said they 'don't know' (Figure 82).


Figure 82: Security agencies sensitize residents on terrorism preparedness and awareness.



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *In the past 12 months, did your outfit or other security agencies sensitize citizens on terrorism preparedness and awareness*

Another question was posed to respondents to elicit their response on how they rated residents' awareness about threats of terrorism from neighboring countries. It is alarming since almost 6 in 10 (55%) of respondents think residents' awareness is low while exactly 1 in 10 (10%) of respondents 'none' of such an awareness exists among residents. Close to 3 in 10 (29%) were rather optimistic and noted that awareness among residents was rather moderate while those who deemed it to be very high were just a few (3%) respondents (Figure 83).

Figure 83: Residents' level of awareness about the threat of terrorism from neighbouring countries?



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *How would you gauge residents' level of awareness about the threat of terrorism from neighbouring countries?*

SECTION 6: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES WITH THE WORK OF SECURITY AGENCIES

Citizens relationship with border management authorities, generally, remains cordial, though most citizens are unwilling to assist with information to apprehend culprits, who usually commit border crimes, especially when it involves a community member; and, interferences by political and traditional leaders to pardon offenders of border security rules. Engagements with security agencies pointed that, the zeal to manage the borders is high, unfortunately, the challenges, in terms of administrative, logistics and operational deficiencies demotivate officials from achieving their target objectives.

Also, security agencies look after their own interests and fulfils their mission based on the governing legislations and supports. There has been no attempt to subsume the functions of agencies at the border points and empower an appropriate organization to take over their tasks. Some challenges identified have been outlined below:

Administrative Challenges

- Limited funds, and sometimes, delays with release of the funds affect institutional programming;
- Inadequate personnel, especially with Ghana Immigration Service, limits the coverage over large areas that prone to be used as unapproved routes. In addition, this puts a strain on personnel as a result of the long duration of shifts;
- Constraints and lack of local capacity at border posts;
- Lack of accommodation for many security service sectors. Personnel are compelled to rent in town/district capitals and commute daily to places of work. This makes it difficult to fight against illicit activities such as smuggling of goods and transiting illegal migrants since in some instances the landlords or their family members are involved in these acts.

Logistical and Operational Challenges

- Poor telecommunications networks, inadequate communication gadgets such as gota, radio, and inadequate vehicles, All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) and motorbikes to aid patrols, quick detection and apprehension of illegal aliens and smugglers of aliens at or near the land borders.
- Lack of structures in most border posts, tents and camp beds leave security officers at the mercy of the weather and are often opened to possible attacks from adversaries.

CHAPTER SIX

AMENITIES IN SURVEYED BORDER COMMUNITIES


INTRODUCTION

Interviewers or Field Research Assistants had the task of observing the sampled communities where the interview respondents were located to ascertain the availability of some services, facilities and nature of roads and record their observations after they had completed the surveys in each community. This section sheds light on the observed findings from the interviewers.

Services present in the survey communities

In terms of services, interviewers noted that mobile phone services were available in majority (92%) of all communities sampled and absent in less than one-tenth (8%), a similar trend with distribution of electricity (91%). In terms of water supply, coverage of boreholes or tube-wells were found in 7 in 10 (74%) and absent in about one-quarter (26%) while piped water systems that most houses could access was in less than half (36%) of communities compared to boreholes or tube-wells, but absent in almost two-thirds (64%) of all communities. The situation was dire in most communities with respect to the absence of sewage systems that most houses could access (90%) and hand washing facilities and sanitization supplies (against COVID-19) (65%) (Figure 84).

Figure 84: Services present in the survey communities




Source: Survey data (2021)

Facilities present in the survey communities

The presence of facilities was assessed as well and had availability of transport services emerging top on the list in majority (84%) of communities while banks, money transfer points, mobile banking services followed at a somewhat distant range in two-thirds (66%) of all communities. Health clinics, either private or public was located in 60 percent of communities surveyed while police stations were absent in majority (80%). Post offices were the least sited facilities in less than one-tenth (8%) of the communities (Figure 85).

Figure 85: Facilities present in the survey communities




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area or in easy walking distance?

Security presence in communities - checkpoints and vehicles

Security presence designated by the presence of road blocks and security agencies' vehicles were absent in most communities, from the lowest (75%) to the highest instances (97%). Settling on specific cases, roadblocks or booms set up by private security providers or by local communities were non-existent in virtually all (97%) communities as was the case for the absence of roadblocks set up by police or the army (80%) and the absence of police officers or police vehicles (77%). However, customs checkpoints were observed in 1 in 6 (61%) of all border localities that were surveyed (Figure 86).

Figure 86: Security presence in communities - checkpoints and vehicles




Source: Survey data (2021)

Nature of roads in survey communities

Exclusive focus was given to the nature of roads in and around the border communities where the survey was conducted. Feeder roads dominated the roads found at the start point of the communities (76%) and most common surface of the road over the last 5 kilometers before arriving at the start point of the community (69%) as opposed to 21 and 27 percent for paved/tarred roads respectively (Figure 87).

Figure 87: Nature of roads in survey communities




Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: Thinking of the journey here: (a) Was the road at the start point in the PSU / EA (b) What was the most common surface of the road over the last 5 kilometers before arriving at the start point of the PSU / EA?

Condition of the road in the last 5 km before reaching the start point of the PSU/EA

Conditions of road networks in the last 5 kilometers before reaching the starting point of sampled border communities were largely found to be in a poor state as can be seen in Figure 88. Interviewers noted that close to half (48%) of road networks leading up to border communities were in 'very poor' conditions and a further one-fifth (18%) were described as 'poor'. On a more positive note, very good or good roads constituted over one-tenth (15%) of all road networks in that category.

Figure 88: Condition of the road in the last 5 km before reaching the start point of the PSU/EA



Source: Survey data (2021) Respondents were asked: *Thinking of the journey here: What was the condition of the road in the last 5 km before reaching the start point of the PSU / EA?*

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion and implications for policy

Responses and perspectives of border residents and officials of security agencies at Ghana's borders do not vary substantially on cross-cutting issues examined in this study, although each category responded to some unique questions. The study recognizes that effective communications services and infrastructure are crucial in security provision as it provides the platform for enhancing timely information and intelligence gathering and dissemination. Although telecommunications network coverage was high along border communities, the quality of voice calls, internet and data connectivity need remarkable improvement. In some areas along the border, the quality of signals for both data and voice calls from neighboring countries was stronger and, in some cases, subsumed that of local telecommunication networks. There is the need for telecommunication companies in the country to work on improving access and quality of voice and data in the border communities since voice and data are crucial in timely information dissemination which is essential for security. A few Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were noted by respondents to be working in the border communities, and most of their areas of focus were not related in any way to crime and security. The looming threat of terrorism calls for an all hands on deck approach to create awareness and build resilience against the threat, and CSOs have a crucial role to play in galvanizing support from all other stakeholders in respect of that. Irrespective of their backgrounds, CSOs are capable partners that need to be provided with the adequate training and capacity to enable them to contribute. It came to light that most border communities did not have their own local radio stations, primarily because most of these places are rural. However, there was a strong indication that the border communities surveyed received radio signals from other communities and thereby providing an avenue for public-wide sensitization on the security implications of border usages, rights and responsibilities of citizens and other useful engagements that would conscientize residents about terrorism and other issues for border residents.

Most residents indicated they lived safely within their communities and construed the relationship between residents and security agencies to be cordial, which to a large extent did not degenerate into many incidents of violent confrontations and violent clashes. There were generally few incidents of harassment and intimidation of residents by security agencies. These are positive indicators that security agencies such as the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Customs Division, Ghana Police Service, etc. working at the border can leverage the current relationship beyond cordiality to one of mutual trust and cooperation. The role of residents involved in community safety was found to be low given there were few communities which had watchdog associations. Identifying and building the capacity of local volunteers to serve as watchdogs in a well-coordinated manner can be a step in the right direction to complement the work of security agencies.

Security agents preferred using informants for gathering information and actionable intelligence, a practice which is part of their convention and this was reflected in responses that revealed this to be the most common mechanism through which residents alerted security agencies about crime and illegal activities at the borders. The availability of other mechanisms such as secured and/or dedicated numbers through which the general public could report any suspicious activity were not a common among the security agencies that are protecting the country's territorial integrity. This is a gap that the various security agencies can work to ameliorate if they are to expand the scope and sources of information needed from the general population. Corroborating this, residents had less contact with security agents to discuss issues relating to crime, however, it appears that civilian stakeholders such as assembly members, religious leaders and traditional authorities were the slightly preferred choice for such discussions. An indication that security agencies and local stakeholders have the opportunity to collaborate and create or make use of existing platforms that can bring on board security agencies, local stakeholders and citizens to discuss security issues of mutual concern.

Regardless of the low level of formal engagement initiated by security agencies with residents in border communities, residents were largely perceived to be uninterested in reporting crime to security agencies. A number of reasons provided point to fear of reprisal attacks, 'shaky' trust in security agencies to protect the identify of respondents and apathy of residents probably because they were complicit in some of the criminal and illegal activities that occurred at the borders. The concerns about why residents are unwilling to provide information and or collaborate with security agencies in dealing with crime need to be examined critically and suitable remedies that are context specific should be applied in dealing with it. Furthermore, security agencies should do more to prosecute cases and secure convictions for criminal offenses as this can serve as a deterrent and potentially incentivize residents to report criminal cases. For instance, the GIS annual performance report for 2016 cited only 6 criminal cases that were with the Legal Directorate for prosecution. One case related to migrant smuggling and 4 cases on human trafficking all of which were undergoing investigations. The study also revealed that inter-agency cooperation and coordination was largely seen to be at work as noted by security agents that responded to the survey, and there is room for this to be further enhanced with timely sharing of intelligence among the agencies.

Among the security agents interviewed, a good number of them had knowledge about issues of terrorism – causes, various groups and their objectives, recruitment and methods and grievances that induce terrorism, although some of them had no knowledge on it. This finding calls for the need for terrorism and counter terrorism to be introduced in the syllable or training modules of security agencies at their training schools for entry level recruits, while already existing in-service training on counter-terrorism continues. In relation to this, a little more than half of security agents interviewed had not undergone any training or drills on terrorism preparedness and awareness, although their admission that significant others in their team had experienced such drills gives positive signals about systematic efforts being made to bring all officers up to speed with the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. Regardless of these, some security agents expressed

reservations about the country's preparedness to detect and deal with threats of terrorism which were largely hinged on inadequate logistics to make their work effective. From both perspectives, residents are largely oblivious to the activities of terrorist groups, the threat of terrorism against Ghana, and violent extremism and terrorism in the West African sub-region. This raises concerns and provides cause for security agencies, the various Municipal and District Assemblies to embark on massive sensitization drives. Closely linked to this is a derivative which shows that the majority of respondents and their family members did not participate in any community sensitization forum on terrorism by a variety of organizations including the security agencies at the borders in spite of the surging threat of terrorism that is drawing closer to the borders of Ghana. The minimal level at which security agencies engaged with residents about these issues requires tremendous efforts to reverse this situation within the short to medium term. It came to light that residents are more inclined to report acts that directly relate to terrorism than other relatively less heinous criminal acts such as for instance burglary; a revelation that presents a nuanced picture about the intention of border residents to support security agencies with information and collaboration to address security threats.

With regards to the issue of secessionist groups seeking to break away from Ghana, about half of residents in the Volta and Oti regions who responded to the interview are aware of the phenomenon, and a similar number were opposed to the secessionist agenda as against a minority that supported their actions. Narratives along the lines of: development/underdevelopment, marginalization, desire for freedom and independence, and issues of post-1956 plebiscite are the underlying reasons as cited by respondents for the secessionist uprising. The complexity of these issues dating back to the pre-colonial era needs to be given critical attention as the government seeks to address the situation. An in-depth research on the matter is required to gain better understanding to inform policy decisions going forward.

Recommendations for policy consideration

In order to build trust and promote a shared sense of responsibility in matters relating to security along the borders between residents and security agencies such as Immigration, Customs, Police etc. a number of measures are suggested for policy consideration to enhance integrated border security management.

Security agencies

- Security agencies should collaborate with local stakeholders such as assembly members and traditional authorities to hold regular community engagements where residents and security agencies can interact. This would make residents more inclined to share vital information needed for effective work. Platforms such as durbars, town hall meetings and radio can be used to promote these interface engagements which can provide a forum for:
 - Educating on the essence of security at the individual, community and national levels through radio;
 - Educating and sensitizing community members on security threats including terrorism;

- Sensitizing community members on useful tips for enhancing security and combating crime;
 - Creating a platform where community members can share their concerns and grievances for all parties to collectively address it; and
 - Security agencies to carefully explain their mandate and any relevant laws that govern their work and the responsible use of the borders by residents, and highlight the role of residents in border management.
- Residents expressed willingness to collaborate with security agencies in fighting criminal activities within their jurisdiction. In collaboration with local stakeholders such as the traditional authorities, the District Assembly and assembly members:
 - Security agencies should identify volunteers among residents and train them with the requisite skills in basic security tips for them to serve as peer educators of community members.
 - Security agencies should identify volunteers, train and constitute them into community watchdog associations to augment their quest to fight border crime.
 - Security agencies should incorporate training modules on counter-terrorism for entry level recruits, and continue providing in-service training and regular refresher training for personnel already in the system.
 - Security agencies should engage local authorities/opinion leaders on the roles of citizens in border security management so that initiative can be cascaded to general community members.
 - Security agencies must foster relationships and partnerships with social institutions such as churches, mosques and schools among others and use their platforms to sensitize community members about the dangers of cross border crimes and the looming threat of terrorism and violent extremism.
 - Security agencies should provide some dedicated numbers or hotlines to community members for residents to report criminal activities.
 - Residents expressed the need for security agencies to conduct themselves professionally, be confidential, avoid taking bribes and that would go a long way to endear community members to have the confidence to reveal critical information to security agencies.
 - Strict enforcement of laws by security agencies is necessary in the fight against crime, particularly by persecuting culprits or offenders to serve as deterrent to the populace in those communities.
 - Strengthen collaboration between internal and neighboring states' security agencies through sharing of resources and information on terrorism and cross-border crimes is crucial

The Government

- The government through the various sector ministries – Interior and Defense – should increase the deployment of security personnel (Immigration, Customs, Military, Police) in border communities, particularly the unapproved areas of entry to reinforce security presence, visibility and expand coverage as part of measures to deal with cross-border crime, armed robbery and threats of terrorism. These enhanced measures would respond to a respondent who noted that they need *“regular presence of security agents at the border especially on market days to prevent armed robbery.”*
- Respondents decried the logistical and infrastructure needs of security personnel that hampered security provision in those areas and tend to be a contributing factor in closing the existing gap between residents and security agencies. To bridge this gap, they cited the need for:
 - Police stations to be built in border communities that had none;
 - Provision of accommodation to security agencies at the borders, particularly Immigration and Customs;
 - Provision of adequate guns and ammunition to personnel of Immigration and customs at the borders;
 - Provide Immigration and Customs with requisite equipment for effective guard duties and border patrols; and
 - Extension of electricity to communities and bases of security personnel at the borders.
- Government should provide the requisite resources to establish duty posts in places without one, and build fences and walls along the border demarcations especially along unapproved routes.
- Alternate livelihood opportunities should be created for residents as a measure to curb smuggling and illicit activities in border communities. This could be achieved through the various Municipal and District Assemblies efforts to forge suitable partnerships with the private sector and from development partners to pioneer Local Economic Development (LED) initiatives.
- As an approach to win the hearts of citizens, government and security agencies should identify and provide some pressing needs and basic public services in communities that are particularly vulnerable to terrorist ideology or infiltration.
- The government and security agencies should develop counter-narratives that would thwart mis/disinformation such as the expiration of the 1956 plebiscite's outcome, a propounded reason that gives the impetus for secessionists claims.

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